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ABSTRACT
Three Essays in Environmental Markets:
Dynamic Behavior, Market Interactions, Policy Implications
Irene Margaret Xiarchos
In order to induce or support voluntary environmental behavior, the mechanisms of existing and
possible environmental markets must be understood. This dissertation analyzes two issues related
to voluntary environmental behavior:
(i) The reactions of firms over the long term to stakeholder concerns about the environment
(essay one).
(ii) Interactions between recycled and primary markets for metals (essays two and three).
Although these essays consider different phenomena, they are underlain by common factors: the
exploration of behavior in environmental markets, the importance of profit as a motivation for
firms’ actions, the centrality of the role of information, and the necessity to look at systems in a
dynamic framework.
Essay one, entitled “An Environmentally Conscious Firm: Dynamic Behavior and Policy
Considerations”, analyzes the environmental practices of a firm conscious that its environmental
behavior influences its reputations and thus its profits. Additionally, it considers the role of and
the opportunities for voluntary programs and public disclosure policies under this formulation.
The analysis is undertaken using dynamic optimization. The title of essay two is “Price and
Volatility Transmission between Primary and Scrap Metal Markets”. This essay empirically
evaluates the dynamic interactions of primary and scrap metal prices through multivariate time
series methods and expands the investigation at the level of volatility transmission. In the related
essay three, “Time-Varying Ratios of Primary and Scrap Metal Prices: The Importance of

Inventories”, potential short term instability between primary and scrap prices is explored
through an examination of primary to scrap price ratios. A model that relates the ratio of primary
and scrap prices to levels of primary metal stocks is proposed and evaluated.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
To induce or support voluntary environmental behavior it is necessary to understand the
behavior of existing and possible environmental markets. This dissertation consists of two
separate studies. The first study, essay one, is a theoretical analysis of the environmental
behavior of firms when stakeholders’ environmental concerns are expressed in the market. In the
second study an existing environmental market, the market for recycled metals, is examined in
light of its relation to the primary material market since metal market participants act in both the
primary and recycled material sector. This study is separated into two essays. Essay two
examines interrelationships among recycled and primary metals in terms of prices and price
instability. Essay three examines short run disequilibrium forces between primary and recycled
material markets, again in terms of prices. Both essays two and three provide insight into market
stimuli and into a key element of fragility in many environmental markets - market instability.
Environmental policy rests on the assumption that firms can be influenced to use
environmentally friendly practices. A basic question, then, relates to the method that
governments choose to influence environmental behavior. Consider two extremes: (1) rely on
fiat – command and control approaches – to force firms to comply with environmental standards
set by government agencies; or (2) consider a situation in which firms, of their own accord, are
free to choose (or not to choose) to consciously establish controls on their own activities. The
first method is purely coercive. The second method is purely voluntary and leaves it to the
individual firm to decrease its waste in line with its own self-interest. A middle ground would be
to push firms toward compliance with government set standards by means of incentives designed
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to induce compliance. Usually such incentives proposed by economists are taxes, subsidies, or
the establishment of rights that would create environmental markets.
It is not illogical to assume that firms often find it in their own self-interest to initiate
environmentally-friendly practices in order to increase their profits by decreasing costs and/or
increasing revenues, currently or over time. The Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991; Porter and van
der Linde, 1995) of benefits arising from controlling pollution and waste has influenced the
business world. This notion has led to an increasing trend for self-initiated pollution reduction
programs. In the presence of profit-making opportunities from undertaking environmentallyfriendly practices, there may be no necessity for direct government intervention. Producers
themselves are quick to perceive new business opportunities. The increasing trend toward
recycling, the turning of waste materials into profitable new products, exemplifies this. Metals,
for example, have been recycled for many years. Recycling reduces the amount of waste to be
disposed of, adds revenue, and decreases pressure on non-renewable resource stocks. While
many metals markets have been producer initiated, some markets for recyclables are fragile,
plagued by market instability and gaps in demand or supply (Field et al., 1994). Such markets
may require government support to operate effectively.
Market opportunities for environmentally aligned actions do not necessarily negate a role
for government. Government action may be needed in the background. For instance, the
government may take the role of setting overall standards, providing information (a public good
by nature), designing programs in ways that influence firms’ actions and provide incentives
towards the adoption of environmental practices, or making sure that the necessary structures are
in place to assure that environmental markets not only arise but are sustainable.

-2-

Essay one considers the fact that disclosing firms’ compliance records to the general
public may be sufficient to nudge firms in a “socially-responsible” direction. The environmental
compliance expectations of important stakeholders may influence the firms environmental
practices by changing their long-run profits prospects. Government involvement can support and
induce such motives with information disclosure policies and by supporting environmentally
friendly behavior through public recognition. Chief among stakeholders are consumers of the
firm’s output, although there may be many other concerned parties as well such as neighboring
communities, investors, lending institutions, and even input suppliers.
The role of information is extremely important. In metal markets, the subject of essays
two and three, information is disseminated within individual markets and among related markets
by prices. In essay one the information on environmental behavior that must pass from the firm
to stakeholders is not necessarily conveyed by market forces. This implies an active role for
government or other intermediary agency to provide information to potential participants.
Finally, while many studies assume that actors and markets react immediately to external
stimuli, these three essays explicitly consider the fact that actors do not take immediate action
nor does action lead to instant reaction. Time is an important element and gives a more realistic
view of markets, allowing for continuity and the linking of one time period to the next. Essay
one considers the firm’s dynamic path over time when the firm incorporates its environmental
reputation into its profit maximization calculus. It becomes clear that the firm’s past and present
reputation on environmental issues affects its future profitability. The effects of time are also
present in essays two and three. Action does not lead to instant reactions due to perception lags,
production lags and to disequilibria. Lags that arise from in learning, production constraints, and
expectation adjustments for example, mean that disequilibrium, rather than equilibrium, is the
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normal state of the market at any one time. Knowledge of this lag structure provides information
on the incentives present in the secondary markets. The findings discussed in essays two and
three indicate that influences between primary and secondary markets actually come through
disequilibrium conditions and time lags.
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CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 1
An Environmentally Conscious Firm:
Dynamic Behavior and Policy Considerations
Abstract
Voluntary programs and public disclosure policies rely on voluntary environmental
behavior. This paper analyzes a firm’s voluntary environmental practices undertaken in reaction
to market signals; it provides a theoretical analysis of a firm which operates in the presence of
consumers and other stakeholders who value environmental actions and respond to the firm’s
environmental history. Environmental reputation links past business behavior to future market
reactions and creates business incentives for environmental involvement. The firm’s voluntary
environmental practices are examined in a dynamic optimization framework and implications for
policy involvement are considered. The analysis shows that the firm’s environmental actions
decrease over time until a steady state is reached where pollution is controlled above the level
expected by consumers and other stakeholders in order to compensate for depreciation. Public
exposure is found to increase long run profits whereas periodic evaluations and periodic
disclosure of environmental performance reduces them. The paper also shows that regulation and
information based policies are complementary as regulation increases long run environmental
pollution control and public exposure leads to higher investment in reputation by
overcompliance.
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I. Introduction
In the last few decades, environmental policy makers have become increasingly
interested in the use of economic incentives to stimulate improvements in environmental quality.
Concurrently there has been a growing awareness of the importance of voluntary environmental
actions. This trend has found supporters within government and industry and among consumers.
In the United States this movement has developed primarily in the form of public programs and
unilateral agreements which rely on individual business efforts and contracts with public
agencies or independent associations. In 1999 there were 54 voluntary programs at the federal
level (National Center of Environmental Economics [NCEE], 2001), and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency projected that by the year 2000 more than thirteen thousand
firms and organizations would participate in EPA voluntary initiatives (Mazurek, 1999). In
addition to this, two thousand companies participated in unilateral initiatives of industry
associations during 1999 (Mazurek, 1999).
This new perspective focuses on incentives that stimulate firm-initiated environmental
behavior. In response to this, the current essay analyzes a firm’s voluntary environmental
practices undertaken in reaction to market signals. The motivation for the firm’s environmental
behavior is assumed to be its ability to influence its profits through its own environmental
actions (Labatt, 1997; Labatt and Maclaren, 1998). The link between environmental behavior
and profitability is environmental reputation (Cavaliere, 2000). The firm’s environmental actions
affect its environmental reputation; its reputation influences its profits.
Wells (2000) and Reed (2001) indicated that participants in voluntary programs
proclaimed reputation value as one of the chief benefits of participation. Specifically Wells
(2000) indicated that companies perceive their participation in voluntary environmental
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programs and public environmental recognition as a way to enhance their corporate reputation,
which has a real but intangible value. Public perception, which is very closely linked to
reputation, has also been found to motivate participation at voluntary programs (Khanna and
Damon, 1999; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Arora and Cason, 1995, 1996).
The financial effect of the intangible value of a firm’s environmental reputation has been
examined by linking environmental behavior to a firm’s market value. Konar and Cohen (2001)
and King and Lenox (2001) found that firms with better environmental records have higher
market value based on their Tobin’s q score.1 Dowell et al. (2000) showed that multinationals
that follow tighter environmental standards than the national ones have higher Tobin’s q. Khanna
and Damon (1999) examined how investors value participation in the 33/50 voluntary program.
They found that participation decreased the average return to investment by 1.2 percent but
increased the average excess value of unit sales by 2.2 percent, indicating that the increased
expenditures from participation lead to short-term losses but increase the investors’ expectations
for long term profitability.2 Nadeau et al. (2004) showed that participation in the Energy Star
buildings voluntary program resulted in a return of $16,026 per million dollars in assets owned
(3.66 percent of the market value of the average participating company) while non-participation
lead to the loss of 10 percent of the asset value of a non-participating company.
Including the element of reputation allows the utilization of a dynamic optimization
framework as environmental reputation links current actions to future market reactions. In this
way the paper discusses self-initiated environmental behavior in a dynamic structure whereas
past literature has dealt with self-initiated behavior of the firm in either a static or a repeated

1

King and Lenox (2001) measured the environmental performance of each firm relative to the performance of other
firms in its industry.
2
The average return to investment is a measure of the current financial performance, whereas the average excess
value of unit sales is a measure of future prospects for a firm.
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finite game framework. Moreover the paper analyses environmental self-compliance and overcompliance of a firm which operates in a monopolistically competitive market. This is the
market setting for most goods and allows for analysis under a more comprehensive form of
market power than does the analysis under monopoly used by Cavaliere (2000) and that of
oligopoly used by Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995).
The paper sets up a theoretical framework, explores pollution control as a firm’s dynamic
path decision, and discusses the implications of firm-initiated environmental behavior.
Moreover, it examines policy implications and incentives for policy involvement which exist
when environmental image influences business decisions. Past research on these issues has
largely taken the form of empirical analysis. This study contributes to the literature by expanding
the theoretical examination of voluntary environmental behavior. It is also able to reveal
possibilities for the role of information provision as an environmental policy, a somewhat
controversial issue.

II. Background
There has been a growing movement on the part of companies to voluntarily undertake
environmentally-friendly actions. Some of these self-initiated efforts have taken the form of
over-complying with regulations (McClelland and Horowitz, 1999), adopting Environmental
Management Systems (EMS) (Khanna and Anton, 2001), or taking part in voluntary pollution
reduction programs such as the Green Light program, the Energy Star Program, the Indoor Air
Program, the Performance Track Programs, or the 33/50 program (NCEE, 2001).
Various incentives for self-regulation and environmental over-compliance have been
analyzed in the literature. A decision for environmental self-regulation can be based on efforts to
avoid liability costs or stricter regulation in the future (Schmidheiny, 1992; Maxwell et al.,
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1998). Environmental over-compliance has also been examined as a tool utilized by firms to
maintain industry leadership or even to prompt the government to tighten environmental
standards and thus raise rivals’ production costs (Salop and Scheffman, 1983; Barrett, 1991;
Innest and Bial, 2002). McClelland and Horowitz (1999) and Bandyopadhyay and Horowitz
(2001) offer the additional possibility that plants over-comply to compensate for uncertainties in
production technologies and emission randomness.
This paper addresses only overcompliance which may be related to the effects of
environmental reputation on revenues and costs. Labatt and Maclaren (1998) suggest that public
concerns and stakeholder pressures are significant voluntary environmental action motivators.
They also note the importance of financial considerations, both in the form of costs and
revenues. The effects of reputation on revenues are associated to consumer reactions. The ability
of firms to extract higher product prices as an incentive for self-initiated environmental behavior
has been modeled by Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995). The authors examined the issue in an
oligopoly framework where firms’ actions are strongly interdependent and found that in the
absence of regulation, the market becomes segregated into high-income consumers buying
environmentally friendly goods and low-income consumers buying goods with no positive
environmental attributes. Cavaliere (2000) indicated that higher reputation means higher
consumer demand.
Consumer concerns and their reactions to product and firm attributes are a major factor in
influencing firms’ actions. Consumer pressures were found to be a significant motivator for the
adoption of an environmental plan (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996). Firms producing final
goods, in close contact with consumers, with higher advertising expenditures, and with more
visible pollution were found to be more likely to participate in voluntary environmental
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programs (Khanna and Damon, 1999; Arora and Cason, 1996; Videras and Alberini, 2000;
Karamanos, 2000).
Environmental reputation can also influence the costs that firms face. Higher
environmental reputation can help in recruiting high quality employees (Reinhardt, 1999;
Carraro and Lévêque, 1999), discourage stakeholder activism (Reinhardt, 1999), and make it
easier to raise money through financial markets (Carraro and Lévêque, 1999). Investors have
been found to react negatively to public disclosures about poor environmental performance as
reported in the TRI (Hamilton, 1995; Khanna et al., 1998), and bankers are beginning to include
environmental considerations in their lending decisions, viewing poor environmental performers
as financially risky (Hoffman, 1997). In addition, supply chain partners may pay a premium to
suppliers with high environmental performance (King and Lenox, 2004). The reason for this is
that environmental problems at the supplier level can impose costs on buyers such as supply
disruptions, spill-over reputation damages (Reinhardt, 1999), and shared liability for
environmental problems caused by the supplier (Snir, 2001). King and Lenox (2004) showed that
reducing information asymmetries with supply chain partners is an important motivator for
businesses and organizations to gain ISO 14001 certification.
The fact that firms undertake voluntary environmental actions to increase their reputation
is reflected in their efforts to obtain external certification of being environmentally-friendly such
as eco-labels or ISO 1400/EMAS certification for the use of an Environmental Management
System. These actions are targeted towards providing consumers with signals that affect
purchasing decisions and towards other stakeholders who can influence the firm’s costs or
business opportunities. Consumer and other stakeholder reactions to a firm’s environmental

- 11 -

behavior based on the information they have in relation to its environmental actions creates
opportunities for using information disclosure as a policy tool.
An increasing number of public disclosure programs have already been put into effect.
These programs reveal firms’ environmental performance. Examples are the TRI (Toxic Release
Inventory) in the United States, the EcoWatch in the Philippines, British Columbia’s List of
Polluters published by the Ontario Ministry of the Environment in Canada, and the PROPER
color-rating program in Indonesia. In addition, voluntary environmental programs supported by
government such as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph provide a new way of
promoting environmental responsibility by offering public recognition and awards to firms with
environmentally-friendly practices. As is suggested throughout this paper, information disclosure
about environmental performance makes it possible for firms to compete in the environmental
arena for price premiums or market shares.
The role of information and public exposure in inducing environmental behavior is of
special interest in this paper. Empirical evidence linking business-led environmental protection
behavior to public exposure and consumer reactions is found in various sources. Arora and
Cason (1995, 1996) argued that public awareness is crucial in inducing firms to participate in the
EPA 33/50 program, a voluntary program for firms to reduce their toxic releases. Dasgupta et al.
(1998) found that environmental exposure results in market retribution, and Konar and Cohen
(1997) found that stock price declines from negative information exposure led subsequently to
higher emission reductions. Khanna et al. (1998) showed that abnormal returns caused by public
disclosure of harmful environmental behavior lead to higher pollution reductions on site. The
World Bank’s study of Indonesia’s Proper environmental color rating program suggested that the
program led to substantial improvements in environmental behavior (Afsah et al., 1996).
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On the other hand, there have been arguments in the literature which refute the
effectiveness of information policies. King and Lenox (2000) found the effects of information
disclosure on environmental improvements to be insignificant. Harrison and Antweiter (2003)
argued that the results of information disclosure policies would not have been important if
influences from traditional policies and independent time trends were not acting at the same
time. Foulon et al. (2003), however, took traditional regulation effects into account and still
found that, in a regulatory environment where both traditional monitoring/enforcement practices
and public disclosure programs are in use, public disclosure creates additional strong incentives
for pollution control.

III. Methodology
Information disclosure of a firm’s environmental performance can influence the behavior
of the firm because it affects its reputation. Cavaliere3 (2000) was the first to model reputation as
a factor leading to environmental behavior and voluntary environmental agreements.
Environmental reputation links present environmental actions of firms to future consumer and
stakeholder reactions. Thus reputation allows the examination of firms’ decisions over time.
The firm’s goal is assumed to be long run profit maximization. To take into account that
consumers distinguish products and firms based on the quality of the firm’s environmental
behavior, a monopolistic competition framework is assumed. This is a typical market for
environmentally friendly products, and it also allows for the investigation of behavior over time
without the use of game theory. Dynamic optimization of the firm’s profits provides long-run
insights as environmental reputation becomes a motivator for continuous environmental
consideration.
3

The analysis was based on a two-stage game between the firm and consumers for the case of monopoly. The firm’s
environmental strategy was chosen in relation to the profits it would produce.
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The analysis unfolds as follows. Self-regulation possibilities and the role of information
in leading firms to take responsibility for their environmental actions are captured by a dynamic
profit optimization model where voluntary environmental actions are undertaken in an effort to
influence environmental reputation. The model is solved in search of the optimal paths of a
firm’s environmental actions. Both mathematical and graphical approaches are used.
Convergence to a steady state is analyzed through a phase diagram to provide qualitative
information about the firm’s behavior over time. The impact of the model’s variables on the long
run behavior of the firm are analyzed using comparative dynamics and steady state comparative
statics. Special attention is given to variables that can be affected by policy. From the solution of
the model and the steady state analysis, policy inferences related to this new method of public
exposure are discussed.
III. a. Theoretical Model
The firm is modeled as a profit maximizer taking into account that revenues and costs are
affected by environmental reputation; environmental reputation is determined by the firm’s
environmentally favorable or unfavorable behavior. In a static market this is expressed as:
Max {Revenue(G)- Cost(G)- s*i}, s.t. G=f(i)

(1)

where G is environmental reputation, i denotes the firm’s environmental practices, and s is the
cost of the environmental practices. The effect of reputation on revenues and costs adheres to the
law of diminishing returns4.
Under this formulation the effect of reputation on revenues and costs differs since
different actors with different motives influence the firm’s revenues and costs. Reputation
influences revenues by changing consumer demand – either shifting the demand function or
changing its shape (Sethi and Thompson, 1981). A better environmental reputation increases
4

The revenue and cost functions are assumed to be strictly concave and convex respectively.
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demand as willingness to pay increases. Since environmental behavior affects revenues, elements
of differentiation are present in the market and the demand curve that the firm faces is
downward-sloping; i.e. the firm operates in a monopolistically competitive market. Reputation
may also influence the firm’s costs. Higher environmental reputation increases the firm’s
financial, supplier, and business opportunities and reduces costs that arise from community and
environmental group pressures.
The problem addressed is inherently dynamic in that environmental market response and
reputation depend on the firm’s past behavior. Consumers and stakeholders are assumed to
expect a certain behavior – amount of pollution control – from the firm and to have access to
information about the firm’s environmental performance. When the firm takes more actions than
expected, its environmental reputation increases.
Expectations are assumed to correspond to the pollution control exerted by the average
firm in the market. Khanna et al. (1998) and Lanoie et al. (1997) indicate that repeated provision
of information allows investors to track the environmental performance of firms relative to that
of other firms as well as to its own past performance. Their studies suggest that benchmarking
creates clear signals of environmental performance and stronger investor reactions. Without a
benchmark polluters do not receive statistically significant losses; a benchmark establishing
lower environmental performance than other firms leads to significant negative returns (Khanna,
2001).
It is important to note that expectations may correspond to the pollution control required
by regulation, but they could also be higher or lower. In cases where environmental groups target
some firms, usually large and well-known corporations, expectations for their environmental
behavior may be higher than that of the average firm in the market. Whatever the case,
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expectations can be expressed as a function of environmental regulation in the industry. Pollution
control above the expected level provides the firm with positive reputation whereas pollution
control lower than the expected level punishes firms with negative reputation.
The fact that reputation changes over time is expressed through the following equation of
motion5:
Ġ = ∂G/∂t=εg(i, f(w))-aG

(2)

Reputation, G, changes as a function of the firm’s pollution abatement, i, relative to the
pollution abatement expected, f(w), and is proportional to the degree of public exposure, ε,
present in the market. Expectations about pollution control are expressed as a function of the
environmental regulation in the industry (w). The degree of public exposure is assumed to be
under the control of the regulatory agency. By promoting information based policies –
information disclosure and voluntary programs that provide signals of positive environmental
performance for participating firms – the regulatory agency can increase the degree of public
exposure. Reputation is also subject to oblivion6 – depreciation7 that occurs over time. Consumer
forgetfulness can be used as a policy instrument as well. For example environmental labels,
certifications, and awards create a more lasting effect on memory whereas periodic evaluations
reduce consumers’ past memory. It should be noted that the equation of motion is concave in
relation to pollution abatement and prevention actions. In most situations, strict concavity occurs,
meaning that increased environmental actions increase reputation but at decreasing rates. Strict
concavity is assumed in the analysis that follows.

5

The environmental reputation has the same type of equation of motion as that found in the advertising literature.
Oblivion refers to the act of forgetting.
7
Reputation is subject to depreciation (Dehez and Jacquemin, 1975; Jacquemin, 1973) due the passage of time and
forgetfulness.
6
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What is of interest is that the firm has control over its own reputation through its
decisions on expenditures for pollution control. By failing to take into account that consumers
and other stakeholders have concerns about the environment and/or have expectations about the
firm’s environmental actions, the firm may find its revenues falling and will, on its own, initiate
actions to improve its environmental image. To the extent that the firm’s environmental actions
affect its revenues and costs, the firm finds it in its self-interest to become conscious of its
environmental behavior relative to what consumers and other stakeholders expect and thus selfregulates its pollution.
The analysis that follows assumes that the firm does not hold inventory and can supply
exactly what is demanded in the market. The firm’s profits are assumed dependent only on its
environmental reputation, G; its behavior has already been maximized in relation to all other
relevant variables.
The objective of the firm is to maximize its stream of discounted profits over time by
controlling its reputation through expenditures on pollution control. The state variable is
reputation, G, and the control variable for the firm is its pollution abatement, i. The time
framework used is infinity. This comes from the fact that environmental reputation acts as
goodwill which can be sold at any time the firm decides to terminate production. A profit
maximizing firm decides upon its pollution control based on the effect of reputation on current
profits as well as changes in its market value which captures the future profits that reputation
brings.
The model is represented as:
∞

Max Π (t ) = ∫ e-δ t {R ( G )) - C (G ) - s ∗ i} dt ; G (0) = Go
0

s.t G = ∂G / ∂t = ε g (i, f ( w)) - aG;

- 17 -

(3)

where ∂R/∂G>0, ∂2R/∂G2<0,
∂C/∂G<0, ∂2C/∂G2>0,
∂g /∂i>0, ∂2g /(∂i)2<0.
R is revenue, C is cost of production, G is the firm’s environmental reputation, s*i is the
firm’s expenditure for environmental practices (s is the cost of pollution abatement and i the
pollution it actually abates), ε is the degree of public exposure, δ is the firm’s discount rate or
opportunity cost of time, w is the level of pollution control imposed by regulation, and a is the
depreciation rate for reputation.

IV. Analysis
IV. a. Solution

In solving this dynamic problem, the current value Hamiltonian becomes:

Hc = R (G ) - C (G ) - s ∗ i + ν c (ε g (i, f ( w)) - aG ) ; G (0) = Go

(4)

The Hamiltonian is jointly concave in the control, i, and state, G.8 Since these concavity
conditions exist, the necessary conditions of the maximum principal (5.1)-(5.3) along with the
transversality condition (5.4) are sufficient for an optimal solution to exist.
i * (t ) maximizes H c (G (t ), i (t ), vc ), i.e
∂H c / ∂i ≤ 0 ⇒ -s + ν c (t) ε∂g (i (t ), f ( w )) / ∂i ≤ 0 , with equality if i * (t ) > 0

(5.1)

∂H c / ∂ν c = G (t ) ⇒ G (t ) = ε g (i (t ), f ( w )) - aG (t )

(5.2)

∂Hc / ∂G = -ν c (t) + δν c (t ) ⇒
⇒ ν c (t) = - { R ′(G (t)) − C ′(G (t))} + (δ + a )ν c (t)

(5.3)

lim t → ∞ ν c (t)G (t)e -δ t = 0
where ν c = ∂ν c (t) / ∂t

(5.4)

The solution of the canonical equations (5.1)-(5.4) subject to G(0)=Go gives the optimal
i*(t), G*(t), and νc*(t) paths. Several behavioral implications can be noted from these conditions.
8

The analysis is conducted under the assumption of strict concavity. The case of a linear relationship between i and
Ġ, will lead to a Most Rapid Approach Path (MRAP) and will be discussed as an extension.
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The costate, νc(t), is positive as indicated by condition (5.1) for any interior solution and
has a natural interpretation as the shadow value of the firm’s environmental reputation. It
measures the additional benefit to the firm from increasing the stock of reputation by a small
amount.
Condition (5.1), which ensures that the marginal cost of pollution control at every point
in time is equal to the marginal benefit that it brings over the remainder of time, is also referred
to as the short-term equilibrium condition. Solving it for an interior solution gives the short run
supply function of environmental practices.
i * (t ) = i (ν c (t ); ε , w, s ) ;
g ′(i (t ))
∂i / ∂ν c = > 0, such that i * (t ) > 0
′′
ν c (t ) g (i (t ))
−1
∂i / ∂s = < 0, such that i * (t ) > 0
ν c (t )ε g ′′(i (t ))
g (i (t ), w)
∂i / ∂w = - iw
>0
g ′′(i (t ))
g ′(i (t ))
∂i / ∂ε = >0
ε g ′′(i (t ))

(6)

This function shows the optimal pollution abatement, or prevention, of an environmentally
conscious firm at every point in time. An increase in the shadow value of reputation, an increase
in regulation, and an increase in public exposure severity all increase environmentally favorable
behavior while increases in the cost of pollution abatement and prevention reduce environmental
actions.
To expand on the relationship between environmental behavior and the shadow value of
reputation, take the time derivative of condition (5.1) and find that pollution abatement and
prevention decrease at the rate of change of the shadow value of reputation multiplied by the
weighted effect of the environmental actions on the firm’s reputation.
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g i vc
− vcε g i − v cε g iii = 0 ⇒ i = −
g ii v c

(7)

Condition (5.2) repeats the equation of motion that must hold at every point in time for
the system to find its optimal solution.
Condition (5.3) states that the marginal opportunity cost, (δ + a )ν c (t) , of investing in
goodwill should be equal to the marginal profit, R′(G * (t)) − C ′(G* (t)) , from increasing goodwill
and the capital goodwill gain, νc (t) . Rearranging equation (5.3) into equation (8), it is easily seen
that oblivion – depreciation (a)– and the discount rate (δ) have a negative impact on the shadow
value of reputation. Given equation (6), the effect of forgetfulness and of the discount rate on
environmentally favorable behavior (i)is also negative; an increase in a or δ will reduce pollution
abatement and prevention, i. Equation (8) also shows that the greater the effect of reputation on
profits, the higher the shadow value of reputation and given equation (6), the greater the
investment in reputation through environmentally positive actions.

νc

{ R ′( G
(t) =

*

(t)) − C ′(G * (t))} + ν c (t)

δ +a

(8)

IV. b. Steady State and Phase Diagram Analysis

The path of G*(t) and vc(t) and, implicitly, i*(t), to a steady state may be further analyzed
with the help of a phase diagram which can answer qualitative questions such as those
concerning the location and dynamic stability of the intertemporal equilibrium and the dynamic
movement of the system from any conceivable initial point. In order to proceed, the modified
Hamiltonian dynamic system (MHDS) is constructed by substituting the short run supply
functions of environmental practices from equation (6) into equations (5.2) and (5.3). This
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dynamic system is expressed in terms of the stock of reputation and its corresponding shadow
value9.
G (t ) = ε g (i * (ν c (t )), f ( w)) - aG (t )

(9)

νc (t) = - { R ′(G (t)) − C ′(G (t))} +(δ +a )ν c (t)
*

*

(10)

The solution to the above system, with boundary conditions delimited by G(0)=Go, and
the transversality condition (5.4), determines the optimal path for reputation G*(t)= Ss(t;…) and
its corresponding shadow value vc(t)=vcs(t;…) as functions of the model’s parameters. Given the
path for the shadow value of reputation, the optimal path for environmental practices is*(t)=
is*(vcs(t;…) is determined.
In the infinite horizon case, interest is focused on the existence of a steady state where the
firm finds itself in a position of equilibrium. Its behavior has been optimized and it has no reason
to change its actions. The path of the implicit solutions of i(t), G(t), and vc(t) to a steady state
may then be analyzed. The long-run equilibrium or steady state for reputation and its
corresponding shadow value are defined as the values (G*∞, vc*∞ ) for which both G and vc are
stationary ( G = vc =0). To characterize the equilibrium, consider the phase diagram presented in
figure 1. The isocines l1 and l2 for the MHDS are the loci in the space (G, vc ) for which G and vc
do not change, G = vc =0.
l 1(G ,ν c ) = ε g (i * (ν c (t )), f ( w)) - aG (t ) = 0

l 2 (G ,ν c ) = - { R ′(G * (t)) − C ′(G * (t)) − aν c (t)} +δν c (t) = 0

9

(11)
(12)

If we replace equation 7 in equations 2 and 3, we would obtain the MHDS representing the dynamic system of the
stock of reputation and of the firm’s environmental practices.
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From l1,

dν c g ′(i )∂i / ∂vc
dν c
δ
=
> 0 . By the monotonicity of the loci,
=
< 0 and from l2,
dG
dG − H ′′(G )
−a

the long-run equilibrium S (G*∞, vc*∞ ), which corresponds to the solution of equations (11) and
(12), is unique.
At the steady state point Ġ=0 and εg(i, f(w))=aG. Since the parameters of the model are
constant at the steady state, the firm controls pollution just enough over the level that is found
appropriate by consumers and other stakeholders to compensate for reputation loss that comes
from memory obsolescence. It is important to note that the consumers’ and stakeholders’
expectation may not necessarily be equal to the actual level of regulation.

Figure 1. Phase Diagram for an Environmentally Conscious Firm
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To test the stability of the steady state, consider the movement around the steady state
point (local stability). The direction of movement is given by partially differentiating the two
differential equations in the MHDS. ∂Ġ /∂vc shows the change in Ġ when vc changes. ∂Ġ /∂vc >0,
so as vc increases Ġ follows the sign sequence of (-,0, +). The change in vc as G changes is given
by ∂νc (t) /∂G. Note that ∂νc (t) /∂G>0, so as G changes, vc follows the sequence (-,0,+). These
streamlines make the steady state a saddle point.
Long run stability will occur as long as the firm finds itself on the stable branches of the
system. For any given initial reputation, the firm must choose an initial shadow value for its
environmental reputation such that the ordered pair of initial environmental reputation and
shadow value of environmental reputation (Go, vco) lies on a stable branch. Otherwise, the
model’s dynamic forces lead to ever increasing reputation and shadow value (northeast) or to
ever decreasing reputation and corresponding lower shadow value (southwest). For the
objectives of environmental policy, the former would be desirable and the latter undesirable;
however, neither would be sustainable strategies for the firm. Initial reputation G(0) is usually
independent of the firm’s choices or of any substantial policy the government can utilize.
Interesting situations occur when something unexpected happens, for example, if an accident
with environmental consequences occurs or a trademark with a specific reputation is bought.
Provided the dynamic movement of the system described by the above phase diagram,
condition (5.3) ensures that the shadow value of reputation declines over time for convergence to
a steady state to be achieved10 (Figure 2). At every passing point of time it declines by the
amount of benefit that reputation could have offered if it were already obtained. So the shadow
price of reputation declines over time by the effect of reputation on profit that is missed from one
10

The case of initial reputation Go being so high that the shadow value of reputation increases while reputation
decreases for convergence to a steady state is not discussed because it is uncommon.
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instant to the next. Since the shadow value of reputation is highest in initial periods and declines
over time, the positive relationship that ties pollution abatement and prevention to the shadow
value of repuation means that the same pattern is observed in pollution abatement and pollution
prevention. Investment in environmental reputation through environmental practices will be
higher in early periods, in order to capture the benefits of the environmentally positive image in
future periods.

Figure 2. Shadow Value of Environmental Reputation: Convergence to a Steady State.

The model leads to a saddle point equilibrium because an optimization rule needs to be
followed. The saddle point equilibrium is attainable but only when the firm places itself on a
stable branch by following the profit optimization rules for the long run. The stability properties
of the system can be extended to include the concept of the global asymptotic stability that
characterizes convergence to equilibrium from any initial state of the system (Brock and
Scheinkman, 1976) and ensures that the firm will place itself on a stable branch of the system.
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The long run solution (G*∞, vc*∞ ) of the MHDS on the stable branch manifold is bounded for
t ε [0,∞), and the curvature matrix C is positive definite for a sufficiently small δ.
⎡
⎢ − H GG
C=⎢
⎢ δ
⎣⎢ 2

δ
⎡
⎤
′′
′′
(
R
(
G
)
C
(
G
))
−
−
⎢
⎥
⎥
2
2
⎥
⎥=⎢
∂i ⎥
δ
⎢
⎥
ε g ′(i )
Hvcvc
∂vc ⎥⎦
2
⎦⎥ ⎣⎢
δ ⎤

As a result, it follows from the theorem by Brock and Scheinkman (1976) that the
equilibrium point (G*∞, vc*∞ ) is asymptotically stable for all bounded solutions. Consequently, at
any conservable initial Go, an initial vco in the steady branches of the system exists which leads
the system to equilibrium11. The logic behind the model’s long run equilibrium stability is that
the firm does have control over its profits, and can, by optimizing its behavior, control its actions
to the point where it reaches its optimum level of profit.
Public disclosure of environmental behavior can, in a theoretical framework, lead firms to
control their pollution over time to reach a state where they control pollution at the level that is
expected by consumers and other stakeholders provided that consumers and stakeholders care
about the environment enough to have a substantial influence over the firm’s profits and
behavior. With perfect foresight and rational behavior, the firm will find itself under the
conditions that lead to long run stability. When perfect knowledge is not available, a firm still
has incentives to become conscious of its environmental behavior but a steady state may not
occur. Some firms, influenced by the Porter hypothesis (Porter,1991; Porter and van der Linde,
1995), may expect benefits from stricter pollution control and increase their expenditures on
pollution control and prevention, but unless these benefits are proven to be real, their efforts will
not necessarily lead to a sustainable strategy of investment.

11

This initial vc is determined by the system.
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IV. c. Long run effects of the model’s parameters

The time paths for i(t), G(t), vc(t), and ultimately Π(t), and the long run steady state
equilibrium depend on the parameters of the problem. Changes in these parameters can have a
significant effect on the behavior of the firm and are, therefore, of interest for policy. The effect
of parameter changes on the steady state can be analyzed with the help of comparative static
analysis, and the effects of parameter changes on the entire optimal path of the firm can be
analyzed using comparative dynamics. Both comparative statics and comparative dynamics can
provide us with insights which may be useful for policy choices.
IV. c. 1. Comparative Statics
The comparative static system at the steady state is obtained by totally differentiating the
system (10) and (11) which produces the solution for the steady state. The determinant of the
system’s Jacobian is negative (│J│< 0).
−a

J =

− ( R ′′(G ) − C ′′(G ))

∂i
∂ vc < 0
δ +a

ε g ′( i )

(13)

To solve for the change of the steady state solutions in relation to the parameters of interest,
consider the subsequent comparative static systems.
Government can affect behavior through command and control regulations. For example,
government can increase standards for emission control or impose some technological standard.
The effect of environmental regulation on the steady state can be found from the following
comparative static system:
⎡ ∂G* (∞)
⎢ ∂w
J⎢ *
⎢ ∂vc (∞)
⎢⎣ ∂w

⎤
*
⎥ ⎡ − ε∂g (i (ν c (t )), f ( w)) ⎤
⎥
⎥=⎢
∂w
⎢
⎥
⎥
0
⎢
⎥
⎣
⎦
⎥⎦
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(14)

By Cramer’s rule ∂G(∞)/∂w<0 and ∂vc(∞)/∂w>0. This means that increases in regulation (w)
lead to lower environmental reputation (∂G(∞)/∂w<0) but higher shadow value of reputation
(∂vc(∞)/∂w>0) and higher pollution control at the steady state.
To examine the effect that the degree of public exposure (ε) has on the long run
equilibrium point, the following comparative static system is used:
⎡ ∂G* (∞)
⎢ ∂ε
J⎢ *
⎢ ∂vc (∞)
⎢⎣ ∂ε

⎤
⎥ ⎡ − g (i* (ν c (t )), f ( w)) ⎤
⎥=⎢
⎥
0
⎥ ⎣
⎦
⎥⎦

(15)

Unless there is no memory loss (α=0), at the long run equilibrium the amount of pollution abated
is greater than expected (i > f(w)); as a consequence ∂G(∞)/∂ε>0 and ∂vc(∞)/∂ε<0. Policies that
increase public exposure (ε) lead to higher reputation accumulation over the long run
(∂G(∞)/∂ε>0) through investment in pollution control beyond the amount expected, but to a
lower shadow value of reputation at equilibrium (∂vc(∞)/∂ε<0) and, subsequently, to lower
pollution control and prevention at the steady state.
It is also interesting to examine the effect of reputation depreciation (α) on the long run
solution using the following comparative static system:

⎡ ∂G * ( ∞ )
⎢ ∂a
J⎢ *
⎢ ∂v c ( ∞ )
⎢⎣ ∂a

⎤
⎥ ⎡ G (t ) ⎤
⎥=⎢
⎥
⎥ ⎣ − v c (t ) ⎦
⎥⎦

(16)

By Cramer’s rule ∂G(∞)/∂α<0 since the shadow value of reputation evaluated at the steady state
is positive (vc(∞)>0), and ∂vc(∞)/∂α >0 as long as avc < ( R′′(G ) − C ′′(G ))G . With more forgetful
consumers, reputation accumulation over time is lower (∂G(∞)/∂α<0), but the shadow value of
reputation at the long run equilibrium is higher (∂vc(∞)/∂α >0) and in consequence pollution
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control at the long run equilibrium is higher since more environmental actions are needed to
compensate for consumer forgetfulness, and vice versa. Consumer forgetfulness as a policy
instrument is contingent on the presence of public disclosure but entails a different judgment
process. It has separate effects on the firm’s behavior and can be used to achieve different goals.
Environmental certification creates a more lasting effect on memory whereas periodic
evaluations that are publicly exposed can be used to reduce consumers’ past memory.
Nonetheless, both involve public exposure.
It is important to note that regulatory and informational policies can be used
simultaneously in influencing firms to develop environmentally conscious behavior and increase
their pollution control.
Finally, it is possible to examine the effect of the discount rate (δ) .
⎡ ∂G * ( ∞ )
⎢ ∂δ
J⎢ *
⎢ ∂v c ( ∞ )
⎢⎣ ∂δ

⎤
⎥ ⎡ 0 ⎤
⎥=⎢ ⎥
⎥ ⎣ − vc ⎦
⎥⎦

(17)

Thus an increase in the discount rate means that at the steady state the firm has lower
reputation accumulation (∂G(∞)/∂δ<0) and this reputation has a lower shadow value
(∂vc(∞)/∂δ<0). Firms that are more interested in the future have larger reputation accumulation
and a higher shadow value for it at the equilibrium, which means higher pollution control and
prevention.
IV.c. 2. Comparative Dynamics
Comparative dynamics show how changes in the model’s parameters affect the entire
optimal profit path of the firm. Substituting the optimal path solutions for G*(t)= Ss(t;…),
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vc(t)=vcs(t;…), is*(t)= is*(vcs(t;…) into the optimal value function Π (t ) expresses this function in
relation to the model’s parameters.
∞

Π * ( w, a, ε , δ ) = ∫ e-δ t {R(Gs(t ; w, a, ε , δ )) - C (Gs(t ; w, a, ε , δ )) - sis* (vcs(t;w, a, ε , δ ) }dt

(18)

0

Changes in the optimal value function induced by changes to the model’s parameters are
obtained by using the dynamic envelope theorem and Leibniz’ rule.
The effect of a change in regulation is negative.
∞

∞

*
∂Π * ( w, a, ε , δ )
∂ ( e -δ t H * )
-δ t
* ε∂g (is , f ( w))
=∫
dt = ∫ e ν cs
dt < 0
∂w
∂w
∂w
0
0

(19)

An increase in regulation reduces profits by the present value of reputation lost due to the
regulation increase.
The effect of a change in public exposure is positive.
∞

∞

∂Π * ( w, a, ε , δ )
∂ ( e -δ t H * )
=∫
dt = ∫ e-δ tν cs* g (is* , f ( w))dt > 0
∂ε
∂
ε
0
0

(20)

This means that environmentally conscious firms welcome more public exposure.
∞

The effect of a change in oblivion is negative, as long as ∫ G * (t )dt > 0 .
0

∞

∞

∂Π * ( w, a, ε , δ )
∂ ( e -δ t H * )
=∫
dt = ∫ e-δ t (−ν cs*G * (t ))dt < 0
∂a
∂a
0
0

(21)

A reduction in consumer forgetfulness increases profits by an amount equal to the present
value of accumulated reputation. This is one of the reasons environmentally conscious firms
∞

usually opt for external certification. ∫ G * (t )dt < 0 may occur in cases where Go is extremely low,
0
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for example when a firm is responsible for an accident that caused high environmental damage.
Under such a situation an increase in consumer forgetfulness increases profits.
The effect of a change in the discount rate is negative.
∞

∞

∂Π * ( w, a, ε , δ )
∂ ( e -δ t H * )
=∫
dt = − ∫ te-δ t {R(.) - C (.)) - sis*} dt .
∂δ
∂δ
0
0
Since the solutions are bounded for tε[0,∞), the net profits π s (t ; w, a, ε , δ ) = R(.) - C (.)) - sis* are
also bounded from above by π s .
∞

∞

∂Π * ( w, a, ε , δ )
−π s
= − ∫ te-δ tπ s dt ≤ −π s ∫ te-δ t dt = 2 < 0
∂δ
δ
0
0

(22)

Thus, an increase in the discount rate reduces profits by an amount equal to the present
value of profits weighted by the length of time they accrue. As a consequence, firms with long
planning horizons as well as firms with low debt to equity ratio are more motivated to undertake
voluntary environmental behavior. Trademark firms, firms traded on the stock market, or firms
in sectors with high investment needs can be targeted by policymakers for participation in
voluntary programs.
IV. d. Most Rapid Approach Path

The model has been solved under the assumption of strict concavity of the current value
Hamiltonian in relation to the control variable – pollution control and prevention – to include the
idea of diminishing returns of environmental actions to environmental reputation and profits. The
choice of expressing this effect through a concave equation of motion is related to the intuition
that environmental actions do not have the same direct and proportional effect on reputation that
investment has on capital accumulation.
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The results of the analysis change substantially if the model becomes linear in the control
variable of environmental actions under a linear representation of the equation of motion. In this
case, the path of the firm becomes a Most Rapid Approach Path (MRAP) to the steady state or
the predetermined stock of reputation where the firm invests in pollution control and prevention
to the maximum allowable amount at every point in time until it reaches this steady state or a
predetermined stock of reputation.
It is possible that a linear representation of the equation of motion would be a better fit
under certain circumstances. A proportional effect of environmental actions on reputation may
be expected in cases where a certain type of behavior is awarded some universally recognizable
label or certification, like an ecolabel, ISO 1400, or Energy Star Program Participant. In these
cases investment in environmental actions provide the firm with the desired external certification
and reputation is rapid and comes as a lump sum. A most rapid approach path can also explain
the behavior of firms that choose to gain from the environmental consciousness of consumers in
markets segregated between an environmental and polluting market such as those described by
Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995). In a segregated market, a firm can be known either as a
polluting or an environmental firm; if it chooses to be an environmental firm it will want to place
itself on this side of the market as fast as possible.
Although the above cases could explain an MRAP to a fixed-end point of reputation
accumulation G(T), it would be difficult for the effect of environmental actions to be assumed
linear in the long run. Even after the firm has achieved a reputation level for joining a market or
obtaining some environmental certification, it may still find it in its own self interest to continue
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the investment process even though the effect of its environmental actions on its reputation may
have changed form12.

V. Discussion and Policy Considerations
This study has analyzed the behavior of an environmentally conscious firm, a firm that
recognizes and acts upon the fact that its environmental actions have an effect on its profits. It
does not constitute a study of overcompliance but rather a study of a firm’s reactions to a market
that punishes negative environmental behavior while rewarding positive environmental behavior.
The fundamental element of this structure is information availability, and its effect on
reputation. The analysis is relevant to both voluntary policies and information disclosure policies
since both provide information that can influence a firm’s reputation. Voluntary programs and
unilateral agreements motivate firms to voluntarily adopt a set of goals, meet specific standards
for environmental performance, or adopt cleaner technologies and methods. They can provide
participants with positive environmental publicity and reputation and, in the consumers’ and
other stakeholders’ view, separate them from firms that have not shown a proactive attitude in
relation to environmental performance. On the other hand, public disclosure policies provide
information, positive or negative, about environmental performance of firms to the public and to
all possible stakeholders.
Note that these two types of policies are complementary. According to Arora and Cason
(1995: p. 274), “there is anecdotal evidence that publication of the TRI data in 1988 ‘shamed’
several top polluting firms to voluntarily reduce toxic releases”, and “the 33/50 program was
developed in part to take advantage of this voluntary sentiment.” Since both these approaches
provide information about the environmental performance of firms, both influence firms’

12

And most probably has become concave.
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environmental reputation. Arora and Cason (1995: p. 274) also state that it is difficult to
distinguish “whether the negative or positive publicity is more important for overcompliance”;
but this does not change their main finding “that voluntary programs benefit from greater
publicity”.
The analysis shows that higher public exposure leads to higher present value of long run
profits for an environmentally-conscious firm although it may have a negative effect on short run
profits (if a firm’s environmental performance is lower than that expected by consumers and
other stakeholders). Therefore, disclosing the environmental performance of overcompliant firms
can reduce political pressures opposing information disclosure policies. For example, the Proper
Color Rating Disclosure Program in Indonesia encourages “good performers to identify
themselves” by rewarding superior environmental with public recognition. In addition the
program renders such firms with “competitive incentives to help regulators identify poor
performers since the latter will be penalized by disclosure”. These incentives reduce the
“principal-agent problem” that has haunted traditional regulation (Afsah et al., 1996: p.11).
Although public exposure has a positive effect on firms’ profits in the long run, oblivion
has a negative effect. By encouraging high or low oblivion, policy can advance different
objectives. High oblivion reduces short run pollution abatement but leads to higher pollution
abatement at the steady state. Indonesia’s Proper Color rating program, Canada’s Non
Compliance List, the United States’ TRI, eco-labels under periodic evaluation, and EU’s Ecomanagement and Audit Scheme (EMAS) are all examples of programs that allow stakeholders to
update their information regularly. Low oblivion, on the other hand, increases short run pollution
control, but in the long run, after the steady state is approached, it means lower pollution control.
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Examples of programs and initiatives that allow for a long-lasting effect of environmental
reputation include: eco-labels that do not undergo periodic evaluation, the standardized EMS
ISO 14000, the Energy Star Program, Responsible Care Initiative of the Chemicals
Manufacturing Association, and environmental awards. It should be noted that with some
permanent labels, like the Energy Star Label for energy efficient buildings, investment in
environmental technology is necessary for certification. These types of programs are usually
related to a proportional effect of environmental actions on reputation. Consequently, in
programs promoting low oblivion a Most Rapid Approach Path can be expected which may be a
policy objective on its own when there is an interest in inducing firms to undertake certain
investments and management changes without delays.
It is evident from the analysis that even though influencing oblivion and providing public
information are both information tools that complement each other in information based policies,
they lead to different results and can be used to achieve different goals.
Finally, there have been discussions in the literature about the effectiveness of
information policies in relation to traditional regulation policies. This study cannot provide direct
input about their effectiveness. Nonetheless, it makes clear that reputation reactions are based on
regulation since regulation influences the market expectations for the environmental performance
and behavior of firms. It also suggests that the effects of information policies cannot easily be
distinguished from the effects of regulation. Nonetheless, it shows that information does have a
role to play as a policy instrument by creating additional pressure for environmental behavior.
Even in Indonesia where regulation is not easily enforceable, regulation provides the basis for
evaluating environmental performance under the Proper Color Rating Disclosure Program
(Afsah et al., 1996). The analysis presented here demonstrates that higher regulation leads to
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higher pollution control both in the short run and at the steady state. Increases in public exposure
also lead to higher pollution control and prevention in the short run. In addition, they lead to
higher reputation at the steady state as public exposure creates incentives for investing in
overcompliance. Therefore, the analysis shows that combining both approaches leads to superior
policy choices and results since policy-makers should be interested in both higher investment in
overcompliance and higher pollution control and prevention.

VI. Conclusion
This study analyzes a firm’s environmental practices as an internal, firm-initiated
decision based upon market signals. This behavior is captured by a dynamic profit optimization
model where voluntary environmental actions are undertaken in an effort to influence
environmental reputation and profits. The link between environmental behavior and profitability
is reputation that is influenced by the firm’s environmental behavior and affects the firm’s
profits. In an era where environmental policy makers take an interest in voluntary environmental
action when designing programs, it is necessary to understand the incentives for voluntary
compliance and overcompliance, and the reactions that different policy tools may induce.
This model of an environmentally conscious firm was solved for the optimal paths of a
firm’s environmental actions to provide insights into the firm’s behavior over time. The study of
the impact of the model’s variables on the firm’s behavior and profits produced further insights
into firms’ motivations for voluntary environmental behavior and their reactions to
environmental policy tools.
The reactions of consumers and other stakeholders to a firm’s environmental behavior are
based on their expectations and on information in relation to the firm’s environmental actions;
this creates opportunities for effective environmental policy. The marginal value of the firm’s
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environmental reputation is always positive when the firm undertakes pollution abatement and
prevention. The short run supply of environmental practices bears a positive relationship to the
shadow value of reputation, to regulation, and to public exposure. The shadow value of
reputation, and thus the firm’s environmental actions, decrease over time and are positively
related to the influence of reputation on profits, to stakeholders’ memory, and to the importance
that the firm exerts on future profits.
In the long run, a unique steady state is produced which is stable in the economic sense of
equilibrium coming from an optimization process. Since the firm has control over its profits,
assuming perfect foresight and rationality, it can reach equilibrium for any conceivable initial
reputation it may hold. At the steady state the firm controls pollution above the level that is
expected by stakeholders to compensate for memory oblivion. Pollution abatement at the steady
state increases with regulation, consumer forgetfulness, and the importance that the firm places
on future profits and decreases with public exposure. On the other hand, reputation increases
with public exposure and the importance that the firm places on future profits and decreases with
regulation and consumer forgetfulness.
Under the incentive of higher reputation leading firms to participate in voluntary
programs and invest in overcompliance, it is necessary for policy-makers to balance their goals
with the methods they use. When considering the attractiveness of voluntary policies for firms
and on which firms to focus, policy-makers should keep in mind that in the long run higher
stakeholder oblivion rates and higher regulation reduce overall firm profits, in contrast to public
exposure and lower firm discount rates. Finally it is important to note that regulatory and
informational policies can not only be used simultaneously to influence firms in developing
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environmentally conscious behavior but can also produce better short run and long run policy
results when combined.
This study examines the behavior of an environmentally conscious firm and is able to
extract some implications for environmental policies from this exercise. However, it does not
deal with optimal levels of pollution control from a social perspective or with welfare
implications. As a society, we may end up with too little or too much pollution control. The
study is also limited in its findings to the extent that it takes into account only reputational
considerations and ignores other motivations for voluntary pollution abatement and
overcompliance which may have important implications.
Future research could explore the implications of voluntary environmental behavior when
firms can choose between innovation and pollution control, especially since many of the
voluntary programs that are in existence largely promote pollution reduction through pollution
prevention and technological or managerial innovation. Firm level interactions, as well as
interactions between firms and the industry, may also provide further insight into how
stakeholder expectations change over time under a structure of reputation and information
providing incentives for voluntary environmental behavior.
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CHAPTER 3: ESSAY 2
Price and Volatility Transmission between Primary and Scrap
Metal Markets
Abstract
The relationship between primary and scrap prices has been hypothesized for the most
part as unidirectional, characterized by spillovers from primary to scrap prices. The purpose of
this study is to evaluate empirically the dynamic interactions between primary and scrap metal
prices through multivariate time series methods. In addition, the study expands the investigation
at the level of volatility transmission which has not been previously examined. The metal prices
utilized are for copper, lead, and zinc for the period 1984-2001. The paper demonstrates differing
long run and short run links. Scrap prices do not improve the long run interpretation of primary
prices, but information flows from the scrap to the primary markets exist in the short run.
Additionally, the copper and lead markets exhibit bidirectional information flows in terms of
volatility transmission.
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I. Introduction
Recycled materials act both as inputs into the production of and as substitutes for refined
primary materials. As a consequence, demand and supply fluctuations in the recycled material
markets both influence and are influenced by the primary material markets. Intermarket
adjustments to market and expectation changes lead to spillover effects. These influences are
evident in terms of relationships among the prices which capture market information (market
movements and expectations) available at every point in time. Therefore, price relationships
express information spillovers that occur between primary and scrap markets.
This study evaluates how primary and scrap metal markets interact through an
examination of price relationships. In the seventies and eighties many studies examined links
between primary and scrap metal fundamentals, including prices, through structural modeling in
which the most popular specification of the relationship between scrap and primary prices was
that primary prices determine scrap prices. This paper tests this assertion using time series
methods to evaluate the direction of influence between primary and scrap prices. In doing so, the
paper revives interest in the links between primary and scrap markets and is the first attempt to
look at this issue without structural assumptions.
The analysis concentrates on three non-ferrous metal markets: copper, lead and zinc. For
each market the dynamic interactions between primary and scrap metal prices are estimated
using multivariate time series methods which bypass structural modeling. Price links are
discussed in both the long run and the short run. While long term variations are driven by
economic equilibrium (steady state) relationships, short term dynamics are affected by random
disturbances and market constraints. Understanding both short and long run relationships is
important because short run relationships, while transitory, may be persistent. In addition, the
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study expands the analysis of primary and scrap price relationships by describing volatility
spillovovers.
The study of volatility is especially important for scrap materials for which there are no
futures markets to offset, even partially, the effects of volatility through hedging. Volatility
approximates how much prices may vary in the future (Weaver and Natcher, 2000). Increased
volatility in a market implies higher uncertainty for participants not only in this market but also
in interrelated markets due to expected spillover effects. Consequently, volatility is often
interpreted as a proxy for information flow over time and across markets (Chan et al., 1991). In
addition, Engle et al. (1990) relate volatility movements to the time required for assimilating new
information. Thus, to better understand the information transmission mechanism between
primary and scrap markets, this study evaluates both price and volatility interdependencies and
addresses questions of how fast information is assimilated, in which direction information flows,
and by which process information is transmitted (i.e. through prices themselves or through the
variance of these prices).
The study shows that the long run relationship between primary and scrap prices is led
for the most part by primary prices while scrap prices follow, as expected, based on the demandpull theory1. The short run relationships differ: primary lead price changes influence scrap lead
price changes, primary zinc price changes follow scrap zinc price changes, whereas in the case of
copper, spillovers are bidirectional. The study also indicates that information transmission occurs
though volatility spillovers in the cases of copper and lead. In the copper market, volatility
transmission from the scrap to the primary market is higher than the volatility transmission from
the primary to the scrap market. These volatility results suggest that even if information flow is
unidirectional in terms of price, information transmission between primary and scrap markets is
1

In the case of copper, scrap prices have an important role in the long run as well.
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bidirectional when the analysis considers price spillovers not only in the first moment (price
levels) but also in the second moment (price volatility).
These findings are important for participants in both the primary and scrap sectors of the
metal industry. Recycled material markets are so closely linked to their primary markets through
complementary and competing relationships that any investigation of these markets must be in
some way conducted in the context of the primary market. In addition, recycling has been
playing an increasingly important role in many primary markets because of technological
advances and in response to concerns about resource depletion and sustainability. At present,
more than 50 percent of the metal industry’s apparent supply comes from recycling.
Consequently, the behavior of recycled material markets, including price volatility, should affect
primary markets.
By establishing empirical relationships for the spillovers between primary and scrap
prices for copper, lead and zinc, the analysis provides market participants with valuable insight
into the interactions of the primary and scrap metal sectors which can be used to improve
forecasting and planning. The study also extends the metal prices forecasting capabilities
especially needed for the highly unpredictable scrap markets.

II. Background
Interactions between primary and scrap markets have been modeled largely using a
structural approach. Fisher and Owen (1981) expressed explicit structural relationships for scrap
and primary aluminium and indicated that primary prices influence scrap prices. Stollery (1983)
modeled the demand and supply relationships between scrap, primary input, and primary output
for copper and steel. His empirical model of copper showed that the scrap price varies in direct
proportion to the primary London Metal Exchange (LME) price. The copper market has also

- 47 -

been modeled under a disequilibrium framework by Labys (1980) and Labys and Kaboudan
(1980). Under their formulation, the direction of influence passes from the primary (LME) to the
scrap price. Taylor (1979) modeled the copper industry in the short run and found that scrap
prices are not only affected by, but also influence, primary prices. Hashimoto (1983) followed
the tradition of structural analysis in simulating steel production from small scale mills. He
argued for simultaneous movements of primary and scrap steel prices due to the industry’s
inherent inelasticities and sensitivity to the business cycle.
Most of these studies assumed that primary price changes determine scrap price changes.
This assumption is in accord with the demand-pull theory in which macroeconomic factors affect
demand for final goods which, in turn, changes the derived demands for production inputs.
Therefore, information spills over from final good prices to input prices.
Metal end uses are heavily concentrated in the durables and engineering sectors which
produce goods in high demand during economic expansions but which stagnate in recessions. As
a consequence, instability in metal markets is demand-driven; information passes down from
final markets though intermediate metal markets to input markets. Tilton and Vogely (1981)
devoted a whole issue of Materials and Society to “Market Instability in the Metal Industries”
where instability was identified as primarily a short run phenomenon caused by inelastic supply
and demand, high-income elasticity of metals, and frequent demand fluctuations from industrial
activity. Labys et al. (1998) note that metal price cycles exist because supply is relatively price
inelastic in the short run whereas demand responds quickly to changes in industrial activity over
the business cycle. Two issues are noted: (1) since the metal supply and demand are
characterized by short run inelasticities, demand changes and spillover effects are largely
indicated by price rather than quantity changes; and (2) the short run horizon is important for
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metal markets; therefore short run information spillovers identified through price and volatility
transmissions should also be considered.
Scrap is an input to refined metal production. Therefore, modeling price spillovers from
the primary to the scrap market is approapriate based on the demand-pull theory. However, scrap
can also substitute for, or complement, refined primary metal in producing metal goods. In
addition, participants in metal markets can act in both the primary and scrap sectors, and
information may be shared in the two markets (Goodwin et al., 1990). Information that enters the
metal market simultaneously alters expectations across both primary and scrap markets.
Reactions to such information provides further information that can spill over between these
markets. Feedback effects and differences in the assimilation of market information between
primary and scrap market sectors could mean that scrap prices influence primary prices, at least
in the short term.
Although price spillovers may be directed only from the primary market to the scrap
market in some market structures, it is not obvious a priori that this assumption holds. Although
one may accept that demand pull theory explains the pricing mechanism in metal markets, useful
information may still be lost by assuming that primary prices are exogenous. Additionally,
interactions between primary and scrap prices differ between the short and long run. As an
example note that Taylor’s (1979) analysis of the copper market in the short term was one of the
few studies to identify price spillovers directed from the scrap to the primary market.
A notable exception to the structural analysis of primary to scrap market links can be
found in the study of the LME copper price behaviour performed by Labys et al. (1971) through
spectral methods. As part of this study, Labys et al. investigated the relationships between the
primary London Metal Exchange (LME) price and scrap copper prices – inspired by references
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for LME leadership over scrap prices (Metals Today, 1965; Brown and Butler, 1968) – and
found that LME prices lead three out of four scrap copper price series.
The present study empirically evaluates information flows between primary and scrap
markets through a multivariate price and volatility model. Price and volatility spillovers have
been previously examined for energy and agricultural markets. Lanza et al. (2005); Girma and
Paulson (1999); Adrangi et al. (2001); Gjolberg and Johnsen (1999); Serletis (1994); and Asche
et al., (2003) examined the links between crude oil and refined product prices. Ewing et al.
(2002) examined volatility transmission between oil and natural gas markets. Volatility spillover
effects in retail meat markets were studied by Rezitis (2003). Finally, the literature in price
transmission between farm and retail prices has focused on transmission asymmetries for which
Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel (2004) provide a summary. Multivariate price and volatility
models have been the most popular method used for examining information spillovers in the
above studies.

III. Methodology
The methodology entails testing price spillovers though multivariate Vector Error
Correction (VECM) Models and volatility transmission through Multivariate Generalized
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) Models. Both the VECM and
GARCH Models are dependent on the Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach which allows
regularities in the data to be studied without imposing as many prior restrictions as structural
models do (Greene, 2000). The VAR reduced form models express every endogenous variable in
the system as a function of the lagged values of all the endogenous variables. Such models are
commonly used for examining links of interrelated time series. To specify the form of the VAR,
however, it is necessary to check for the integration and cointegration characteristics of the
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primary and scrap price series. For example, stationary data are modeled in levels.
Nonstationarity implies that the VAR should be specified in first differences. When cointegration
is present in addition to non-stationarity, the VAR is transformed to a VECM which reveals and
distinguishes long run relations (cointegration) between primary and scrap prices from the noise
of short run fluctuations (changes). After the VECM models are specified, price interrelations are
studied in the long and short run. Additionally the errors of the VECM formulations are used to
construct the MGARCH models which provide the basis for examining volatility spillovers.
III. a.Vector Autoregression

The form of the VAR for primary and scrap prices is:
Pt = A1 Pt −1 + ... + Ap Pt − p + ε t

ε t⏐I t -1 ∼ N (0, H t )

(1)

where Pt is a k×1 vector of monthly primary (Pp) and secondary prices (Ps) and εt is the k×1
vector of random errors which includes the innovation for each market at time t with its
corresponding k×k conditional variance covariance matrix Ht. The αij elements of the k×k matrix
A represent the degree of price transmission from each market i to market j. This model provides
the conditional expected price equations given the market information available at time t-1 (It-1).
The model specification is determined by the integration properties of the primary and scrap
prices. Based on the random errors of the price equations, the conditional volatility of the
primary and scrap prices is then modeled.
III. b. Price Links Modeling

The specification of the VAR models entails the following steps. First, the primary and
scrap price series are tested for unit roots with the non-parametric P-P unit root test developed by
Phillips and Perron (1988). The Phillips and Perron unit root test is preferred to the augmented
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Dickey and Fuller (1981) test because it is robust with respect to the presence of serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity.
The second step deals with the presence of a long run relationship between primary and
scrap prices. A long-run equilibrium between primary and scrap prices is said to exist if the
series are found to be cointegrated2. Engle and Granger (1987) first pointed out that a linear
combination of two or more non-stationary (with a unit root) series may be stationary. If such a
stationary, or I(0), linear combination exists, the non-stationary time series are said to be
cointegrated. The stationary linear combination is called the cointegrating equation and may be
interpreted as a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables. The Johansen (1991,
1995) cointegration tests based on a VAR approach are used. This step allows identification of
the proper specification of the price mean models which includes both the long run equilibrium
relationship between primary and scrap prices and their short run adjustments.
Johansen’s method tests the restrictions imposed by co-integration on the unrestricted
VAR model in equation (1). To test for the cointegrating restrictions between the variables, the
VAR is transformed using the following Vector Error Correction (VECM) specification:
p −1

ΔPt = Π Pt −1 + ∑ Γi ΔPt −i + εt

(2)

i =1

p

p

i =1

j =i +1

where Π = ∑ Ai − Ii , Γi = − ∑ Aj
Granger’s representation theorem (Johansen, 1991; Engle and Granger, 1987) asserts that if the
coefficient matrix Π has reduced rank r < k, then there exist k × r matrices α and β each with
rank r such that Π = αβ' and β'Pt is stationary. The variable, r, is the number of cointegrating

2

In order to test for such a relationship, it must be established that the primary and scrap prices are integrated of the
same order.
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relations (the cointegrating rank), each column of β is the cointegrating vector, and elements of α
are known as the adjustment parameters to the cointegrating restrictions.
The VECM models produced restrict the long-run behavior of the endogenous variables
to converge to their cointegrating relationships while allowing a wide range of short run
dynamics. Since the VECM models include both short run and long run dynamics, they can be
used to separate long run from short run spillovers between primary and scrap prices. To identify
the long run price leader, weak exogeneity tests are performed. The vector α contains the
information about weak exogeneity (Johansen and Juselius, 1990). If one of the elements in α is
zero, there will be no long run causation towards this variable within the system; this variable is
weakly exogenous, i.e. it drives the system in the long run. This variable is strongly exogenous if
moreover, it is not affected by the short run dynamics of other variables in the system. Granger
causality tests (Granger, 1969) indicate the direction of influence in the short run between
primary and scrap prices. If the lag structure of the short run changes of the i price series adds to
the explanatory power of the short run changes of the j price series, then it “Granger causes” this
series in the short term.
III. c. Volatility Links Modeling

Interrelations between primary and secondary markets are also inferred by analyzing the
conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht. The errors of the VECM price models εt |It-1~N(0, Ht)
are used to represent the residual conditional volatility in a Multivariate Generalized
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) framework so that volatility
transmission may be studied3. The most obvious application of MGARCH models is the study of

3

Although the conditional mean (VECM) parameters generally enter the conditional variance specification through
the residuals, the GARCH parameters do not affect the conditional mean (Bauwens et al., 2003). In this way, use of
a two-stage procedure allows, with only a small loss in efficiency, consistent estimation of the price level onnections
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the relationships between the volatilities of multiple markets (Kearney and Patton, 2000; Karolyi,
1995). The MGARCH can help explain whether the volatility of one market is leading the
volatility of other markets, whether the volatility of a price is transmitted to another price directly
(through its conditional variance) or indirectly (through its conditional covariances), or whether a
shock within a market increases volatility within another market, and if so, by how much.
Under the MGARCH representation each element of the conditional variance-covariance
matrix Ht is a function of the lagged squared innovations, the past cross products of innovations,
and the lagged values of the elements of Ht. The MGARCH parameterization used here is the
BEKK model introduced by Engle and Kroner (1995) which incorporates quadratic forms to
ensure the positive semi-definiteness of the variance-covariance matrix. The BEKK
parametrization for the MGARCH (1, 1, k) is represented as:
H t = CC '+ B′H t −1 B + D ' ε t −1ε t −1 D

(3)

Where C is an k×k lower triangular matrix with parameters expressing the constants, B is a k×k
square matrix that includes the elements bij which measure the degree of transmission of past
conditional variance from market i to market j, and D is also a k×k square matrix that includes
the elements dij, which capture the effect of shocks or unexpected events in market i on market j.
This specification requires the estimation of a limited number of parameters while
simultaneously allowing sufficient generality by representing direct and indirect volatility
transmission between the primary and scrap prices (Karolyi, 1995).
For the bivariate case the GARCH (1, 1) is:

from the VECM of the market, and afterwards represents the volatility connections in an M-Garch, using the
residuals produced from the VECM models.
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(4)

The parameters in the matrices C, B, and D cannot be explained independently; the interest lies
within the functions of the parameters which form the intercept terms and the coefficients of the
lagged variances/covariances and innovations/coinnovations (Kearney and Patton, 2000). The
conditional variance for each equation in the bivariate GARCH (1, 1) is expanded in equations
(5) and (6) to represent these coefficients and show how volatility and shocks are transmitted
between primary and scrap prices and over time.

h11,t = c112 + b112 ε1,2t −1 + b11b21ε1,t -1e2,t -1 + b212 ε 2,2 t −1 + d112 h11,t -1 + d11d 21h21,t -1 + d 212 h22,t -1
h22,t = c + c + b ε
2
21

2
22

2 2
12 1,t −1

+ b22b12ε1,t -1ε 2,t -1 + b ε

2 2
22 2,t −1

2
12 11,t -1

+d h

(5)
2
22 22,t -1

+ d 22 d12 h21,t -1 + d h

(6)

IV. Empirical Analysis
The description of primary and scrap prices is followed by unit root testing and
cointegration analysis. Cointegration analysis includes the estimation of the long run equilibrium
relationship that links primary and scrap prices as well as the computation of the adjustment rates
of short run primary and scrap price towards their long run equilibrium. The VECM models are
constructed from the cointegration results and used to examine the direction of price
transmission in the short and long run. The VECM models also constitute the basis for describing
weak and strong exogeneity which convey information on whether scrap prices lead primary
prices or whether primary prices lead scrap prices in the short and long run. Finally, MGARCH
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models computed from the errors of the VECM representations assess the direction and speed of
volatility transmission.4
IV. a. Data

Three metal markets are analysed: copper, lead, and zinc. Lead is the most recycled
metal; 71 percent of apparent supply in the lead market is provided by recycled materials. One of
the least recycled metals is zinc at 26 percent (USGS, 2002). Therefore, this study includes
metals with high (lead), medium (copper), and low (zinc) recycling rates. Table 1 gives recycling
rates by metal for selected years.
Table 1. Recycling Rates and Old to New Scrap Ratios by Metal

Copper
Recycled %
Old/New Ratio
Lead
Recycled %
Old/New Ratio
Zinc
Recycled %
Old/New Ratio

1998

2000

2002

35.7
33/67

32.1
27/73

30.4
20/80

63.1
95.5/4.5

62.6
96.5/3.5

71.4
97/3

27.5
21/79

26.9
16/84

25.6
13/87

Computed from Salient US Recycling Statistics for Selected Metals (USGS, 2003)

The data employed consist of United States average monthly primary and scrap metal
prices. The time periods examined are 1984-2001 for copper, 1984-2000 for lead and 1984-1996
for zinc. Primary prices are prices for refined metal which can be produced from either primary
ore/concentrate or scrap metal. The primary prices used are the producer price of delivered
copper cathode (PPC), the New York delivery prices of the primary producers’ pig lead (PPL),
and the domestic and foreign producer prices for primary zinc slab delivered in the United States
4

Computations for specifying and analysing the VECM models were performed in Eviews (version 5.1). MGARCH
models were computed in Matlab (version 6.5) using code from the UCSD GARCH toolbox for Matlab developed
by K.K. Sheppard.
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(PPZ)5. The focus of this paper is on the United States market. Consequently, United States
producer prices are utilized even though LME prices are used internationally as reference prices.
Edwards and Robbins (1979) indicate that, after the middle of 1970, producer prices reflect the
metal exchange spot prices closely. Figuerola-Ferretti and Gilbert (2001) also show that current
producer price volatility in non-ferrous metals is not much smaller than that of market exchange
prices.
Commercial scrap metal can be divided into new and old scrap. New scrap, such as
cuttings and turnings, is generated during processing and fabrication of metal products and is
usually denoted as No. 1 scrap. It is desirable for its higher quality and for its consistency in
terms of content and supply. Old scrap (usually No. 2 scrap) is metal incorporated in postconsumer products, obsolete manufactured products, or spent materials. The relative utilization
of old and new scrap in each market for sample years is shown in table 1 above. Both new and
old scrap prices are used in the study. New scrap prices included are the price for brass mills
No.1 copper scrap (PS1C) and the price of new zinc clippings (PSZ). Old scrap prices in the
study are the price for refiners’ No. 2 copper scrap (PS2C) and the smelters’ buying price for
heavy soft scrap lead (PSL)6.
As the graphs in figure 1 show, primary prices are correlated with scrap prices. However,
primary and scrap prices are not always in correspondence and substantial short term volatility
exists. Table 2 indicates that the degree of variation is higher for scrap prices in terms of both
volatility and coefficients of variation. This result agrees with the findings of Edgren and

5

PPC was obtained from the United States Geological Survey specialist D.L Edelstein, PPL is published in the
Commodity Research Bureau Commodity Yearbook, and PPZ is available in the Metal Statistics publication of the
American Metal Market. The length of each time series is determined by data availability and compatibility.
6
The Metal Statistics publication of the American Metal Market is the source for PSL and PSZ. PS1C and PS2C
data were obtained from United States Geological Survey specialist D.L. Edelstein. The length of each time series is
determined by data availability and compatibility.

- 57 -

5 .2
------ L N P P C

5 .0
4 .8
4 .6
4 .4
4 .2

-----L N P S 2 C

------- L N P S 1 C

4 .0
3 .8
3 .6
8 4

8 6

8 8

9 0

9 2

9 4

9 6

9 8

0 0

Copper (1984-2000)
4 .5
4 .0
------ L N P P L
3 .5
3 .0
- -----L N P S L

2 .5
2 .0
1 .5
1 9 8 4

1 9 8 6

1 9 8 8

1 99 0

1 9 9 2

1 9 9 4

1 9 9 6

1 9 9 8

2 0 0 0

Lead (1984-2000)
4 .8
-- ----- L N P P Z

4 .4
4 .0
3 .6

L N P S Z ------3 .2
2 .8
2 .4
8 4

8 5

8 6

8 7

8 8

8 9

9 0

9 1

9 2

9 3

Zinc (1984-2000)

Figure 1. Primary and Scrap Price Series by Metal
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Table 2. Characteristics of Primary and Scrap Prices by Metal
Characteristic

Price Series
Lead

Copper

Zinc

PPC

PS1C

PS2C

PPL

PSL

PPZ

PSZ

Mean

4.545

4.443

4.271

3.602

2.690

3.952

3.384

Standard Deviation

0.255

0.257

0.271

0.277

0.360

0.237

0.356

Coef. of Variation

0.056

0.058

0.064

0.077

0.134

0.060

0.105

Skewness

0.033

-0.196

-0.156

-0.969

-0.914

0.425

-0.402

Kurtosis

1.838

1.793

1.697

3.078

3.220

2.949

2.271

Jarque-Bera (J-B)

12.187

14.499

16.164

31.960

28.816

4.702

7.662

Probability (J-B)

0.002

0.001

0.0003

0.000

0.000

0.095

0.022

Moreland (1990), Slade (1980), and Van Beukering and Bouman (2001) that price volatility is
higher in recycled relative to primary material markets. However, this finding is constrained to a
long run measure of volatility.
IV. b. Integration and Cointegration

The Phillips and Perron (1988) (P-P) unit root tests are appropriate tests for unit roots for
the price series considered. The results are reported in Table 3. The hypothesis of a unit root in
each price series cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level, indicating that primary
and scrap prices are non-stationary. The next step is to check whether the price series are
integrated of order one [I(1)]: rejection of a unit root in the first differences of the prices suffices.
Table 3 shows that nonstationarity is rejected for first differences, suggesting that all variables
are I(1).
Nonstationarity means that the prices will be represented in first differences. Time series
characteristics of price changes are presented in table 4. Table 5 presents the Ljung-Box Qstatistics for the squared residuals of the univariate first difference price models and Engle’s
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) in the
residuals (Engle 1982). The test results suggest that the primary and scrap price change residuals
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Table 3. Phillips Perron Unit-Root Tests by Metal
Level
P-P Value
Probability*

Series
Copper

First Difference
P-P Value
Probability*

Critical Value
1%
5%

PPC
PS1C
PS2C

-1.937
-1.777
-1.813

0.3149
0.3914
0.3734

-10.871
-12.459
-12.605

0.000
0.000
0.000

-3.462
-3.462
-3.462

-2.876
-2.876
-2.876

PPL
PSL

-1.688
-1.961

0.436
0.304

-10.180
-11.736

0.000
0.000

-3.462
-3.462

-2.876
-2.876

PPZ
PSZ

-1.864
-1.899

0.349
0.332

-7.673
11.039

0.000
0.000

-3.473
-3.473

-2.880
-2.880

Lead

Zinc

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root
Constant included at the test regression; the test results were insensitive to the addition of a trend in the test
regression.

Table 4. Characteristics of Primary and Scrap Price Changes by Metal
Characteristic

Price Series
Lead

Copper

Zinc

ΔPPC

ΔPS1C

ΔPS2C

ΔPPL

ΔPSL

ΔPPZ

ΔPSZ

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.003

0.002

0.001

0.003

0.057
213.362

0.055
304.434

0.061
246.165

0.049
17.925

0.070
28.742

0.049
38.824

0.067
22.171

Skewness

0.331

0.107

-0.041

1.052

0.458

-0.211

5.951

Kurtosis

4.849

3.687

4.265

10.931

8.629

3.714

52.320

Jarque-Bera (J-B)

34.724

4.661

14.458

572.264

276.497

5.137

19198.490

Probability (J-B)

0.000

0.097

0.001

0.000

0.000

0.077

0.000

Mean
Standard Deviation
Coef. of Variation

Table 5. Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity Tests by Metal
εt= ΔPt – ΣaiΔPt-1

Q²(10)
Probability
ARCH LM
Probability

ΔPPC
48.893
0
5.793
0.016

Copper
ΔPS1C
19.074
0.025
1.988
0.159

Lead
ΔPS2C
23.005
0.003
5.264
0.022
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ΔPPL
22.244
0.008
15.405
0

Zinc
ΔPSL
17.972
0.035
15.083
0

ΔPPZ
14.939
0.093
0.634
0.426

ΔPSZ
0.487
1
0.015
0.902

for the copper and lead markets are characterized by autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity. It is evident that there is no autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity in
the residuals of zinc price changes.
Since both primary and scrap prices are integrated of the same order, i.e. I(1), in each
market it is possible that they are cointegrated. Cointegration tests indicated the long run
equilibrium relationships between primary and scrap prices. The results of the Johansen (1991,
1995) cointegration tests are presented in table 6. Cointegration between primary and scrap
prices is indicated and one cointegration relationship is found to link primary to scrap prices in
each market. Two common stochastic trends are present in the copper system and one each in the
lead and zinc systems. Cointegration implies that even though short run dynamics may be in
disequilibrium, primary and scrap prices are intrinsically linked and cannot wander arbitrarily far
away from each other.

Table 6. Johansen Cointegration Tests by Metal
Prices

No. C.E.s Ho: r=p

Maximum Eigenvalue Test

Trace Test
Statistic 5% Crit.Val. Prob.**
42.646*
35.193
0.007
15.269
20.262
0.211
3.280
9.165
0.530

1

p=0
p≤ 1
p≤ 2

Statistic 5% Crit.Val. Prob.**
27.377*
22.300
0.009
11.989
15.892
0.187
3.280
9.165
0.530

Lead
PPL, PSL

1

p=0
p≤ 1

16.427*
4.022

15.892
9.165

0.041
0.409

20.449*
4.022

20.262
9.165

0.047
0.409

Zinc
PPZ, PSZ

1

p=0
p≤ 1

17.845*
2.616

15.892
9.165

0.024
0.655

20.460*
2.616

20.262
9.165

0.047
0.655

Copper
PPC, PS1C,PS2C

*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
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Normalizing with respect to the coefficient of the primary price produces the long run
price relationship between primary and scrap metal in each market. These are expressed by
equations (7) - (9). The long run relationship of old copper scrap prices to primary and new scrap
prices is relatively weak. However, bivariate cointegration tests7 establish that old copper prices
do hold a long run relationship both to primary and old scrap prices.
βc: PPC - 0.416 - 0.526PS1C + 0.42PS2C

(7)

βl: PPL - 1.452 - 0.798PSL

(8)

βz: PPZ - 1.775 - 0.636PSZ

(9)

[-2.41]** [-1.73]*

[ 1.45]

[-7.81]*** [-11.64]***

[-4.88]*** [-5.94]***

As shown in table 7, the adjustment speed of primary and scrap prices to their long run
equilibrium differs among the three markets. In the lead and zinc markets the parameter
associated with the scrap price (0.167 and 0.123, respectively) is substantially larger than the one
related to primary prices (-0.012 and -0.035, respectively). This suggests that lead and zinc scrap
prices react much more intensely to unanticipated shocks than do their respective primary prices.
In addition, most of the shift towards the long run relationship between primary and scrap prices
is borne by adjustments in the scrap market; this is denoted by the fact that only scrap prices
have statistically significant adjustment rates. This is not true in the case of copper where the
speed of adjustment is relatively symmetric for primary and scrap prices.
The magnitude of the adjustment parameters is not high8. This implies a moderate speed
of price adjustments towards the equilibrium relationship between primary and scrap prices after
unexpected shocks. It also suggests that short run conditions can be persistent and denotes the
importance of understanding the short-term interactions between primary and scrap prices.

7
8

Not presented in the paper, but available upon request.
The speed of adjustment can range from zero to one.
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Table 7. Speed of Adjustment for Primary and Scrap Prices
to their Long-run Equilibrium by Metal
System (i)

Variable (j)

αi,j

t value

Copper

Δ(PPC)
Δ(PS1C)
Δ(PS2C)

-0.149
0.171
0.168

[-1.548]
[ 1.863]*
[ 1.673]*

Lead

Δ(PPL)
Δ(PSL)

-0.012
0.167

[-0.361]
[ 3.857]***

Zinc

Δ(PPZ)
Δ(PSZ)

-0.035
0.123

[-1.647]
[ 3.879]***

t-statistics in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at *--0.10, **--0..05, ***--0.01 level.

IV. c. Price Transmission

The estimated VECM models describe short run price movements while restricting the
long run price movements so that primary and scrap prices in each market converge to their
respective cointegrating relationship shown in equations (7) - (9) above. The results in table 8
show that the error correction term (cointegrating relationship between primary and scrap prices)
can always be used to explain the next period’s scrap price change in every market. In the cases
of zinc and copper the error correction term, though insignificant at the 10 percent significance
level, is significant if a significance level of 15 percent is accepted.
Table 8 shows that statistically significant short run information spillovers come from
prices lagged by only one month, indicating fast assimilation of short run information. Short run
primary copper price changes influence scrap price changes with a lag of one month. Price
changes of new scrap copper have a significant effect on the next period’s primary price changes
as well as on old copper prices. In the lead market, short run information passes from the primary
to the scrap market; in the case of zinc, information spillovers are directed from scrap prices to
primary prices.
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Table 8. VECM Models by Metal
Copper

βc

lag1 Δ(PPC)

Lead

Δ(PPC)

Δ(PS1C)

Δ(PS2C)

-0.148996

0.17077

0.167733

[-1.548]

[ 1.863]*

[ 1.673]*

0.214

0.397

0.419

βl

lag1 Δ(PS1C)

lag1 Δ(PS2C)

0.332

-0.202

0.385

[ 1.795]*

[-1.147]

[ 1.999]**

-0.144

0.103

-0.406

[-0.841]

[ 0.633]

[-2.277]**

-0.082

-0.112

-0.193

[-0.705]

[-1.005]

[-1.587]

0.031

-0.233

0.085

[ 0.166]

[-1.324]

[ 0.442]

-0.105

0.112

-0.157

[-0.620]
0.134

[ 0.693]
0.164

[-0.889]
0.183

AIC

-2.969

-3.067

-2.888

SC

-2.859

-2.957

-2.778

lag2 Δ(PPC)

lag2 Δ(PS1C)

lag2 Δ(PS2C)
Adj.R²

Δ(PPL)

Δ(PSL)

-0.012

0.167

[-0.361]

[ 3.857]***

0.312

0.379

lag1 Δ(PPL)

[ 1.736]* [ 3.380]*** [ 3.258]***

Zinc

βz

lag1 Δ(PPZ)

[ 4.040]*** [ 3.701]***
lag1 Δ(PSL)

0.011

0.102

[ 0.222]

[ 1.527]

Adj.R²

0.084

0.209

AIC

-3.256

-2.692

SC

-3.208

-2.643

lag1 Δ(PSZ)

Δ(PPZ)

Δ(PSZ)

-0.035

0.123

[-1.647]

[ 3.879]***

0.491

0.08

[ 6.681]***

[ 0.726]

-0.109

0.089

[-2.153]**

[ 1.165]

Adj.R²

0.230

0.105

AIC

-3.411

-2.601

SC

-3.352

-2.542

Q(10) 88.469 [0.09]

Q(10) 33.038 [0.61]

Q(10) 18.267 [0.99]

LM(1) 11.236 [0.25]

LM(1) 4.097 [0.39]

LM(1) 0.872 [0.93]

LM(4) 1.447 [0.99]

LM(4) 5.243 [0.26]

LM(4) 3.240 [0.51]

t-statistics in in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at *--0.10, **--0..05, ***--0.01 level.

Interestingly, new scrap copper, lead scrap, and zinc scrap prices do not pass information
in their own markets over time. This finding seems to support the modeling approach of Stollery
(1983), Fisher and Owen (1981), and Labys (1980) which describes scrap prices as a function of
primary prices alone. However, as can be seen in table 8 the analysis does not find this
relationship to hold for old copper scrap prices; old copper scrap prices pass information in their
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own market over time. The contradiction of this finding to the above studies is even more
pronounced due to the fact that Stollery (1983) and Labys (1980) were describing the behavior of
old copper scrap. In addition, the cointegration term that affects scrap prices in every market
includes past information from the scrap prices.
The VECM models allow examination of both the long and the short run relationships
between primary and scrap prices. Weak exogeneity tests that allow inferences about long run
price leadership are presented in table 9. It is clear that in the lead market primary prices are
weakly exogenous and scrap prices react to changes in the primary prices. The evidence for weak
exogeneity of primary price is not as strong in the copper and zinc markets. However, it can be
concluded that zinc primary prices lead the market in the long run. In contrast, though primary
copper prices are weakly exogenous at a confidence level of 14 percent, they do not lead the
market since old scrap prices are found to be weakly exogenous as well at a confidence level of
12 percent. Thus, new scrap prices react to changes in both primary and old scrap prices.

Table 9. Weak Exogeneity Tests by Metal
System
Copper

Lead
Zinc

Variable

Exogeneity Test

LR Stat.

Probability

PPC
PS1C
PS2C
PPL
PSL
PPZ
PSZ

αppc=0
αps1c=0
αps2c=0
αppl=0
αpsl=0
αppz=0
αpsz=0

2.173
3.145
2.383
0.101
11.012
2.357
17.845

0.140
0.076
0.123
0.751
0.001
0.125
0.024

From the weak exogeneity tests it is inferred that scrap prices cannot be used to forecast
primary prices in the long run. For this to be the case in the short run as well, the primary prices
must also be strongly exogenous and, hence, not be affected by the short run movements in the
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scrap prices. Table 10 shows that primary prices are strongly exogenous in the case of lead, since
in addition to long run primary price leadership, short run changes in scrap prices do not
“Granger cause” short run changes in primary prices. In the case of zinc, primary prices are
“Granger caused” by scrap zinc prices. In addition, short run changes in primary prices cannot be
used in forecasting short run changes in scrap zinc prices. Therefore in the short run scrap zinc
prices lead primary zinc prices. In the case of copper, the Granger causality results show that
even though there is information spillover in the short run from the new scrap market to the
primary market, the prediction of short run changes in primary copper prices is not improved by
adding lags of short run scrap price changes. Additionally, the results indicate that primary prices
“Granger cause” new scrap prices in the short run. However, they do not “Granger cause” old
scrap price changes; the prediction of old scrap prices is improved by including new scrap price
information.

Table 10. Granger Causality Tests by Metal
System

Ho
Δ(PS1C)≠→Δ(PPC)
Δ(PS2C)≠→Δ(PPC)
Δ(PS1C),Δ(PS2C)≠→Δ(PPC)
Δ(PPC)≠→Δ(PS1C)
Δ(PPC)≠→Δ(PS2C)
Δ(PS1C)≠→Δ(PS2C)
Δ(PS2C)≠→Δ(PS1C)

Chi-sq

df

Probability

3.613
0.798
5.901
17.467
0.627
19.826
4.165

2
2
4
2
2
2
2

0.164
0.671
0.207
0.000
0.731
0.000
0.125

Lead

Δ(PSL)≠→Δ(PPL)
Δ(PPL)≠→Δ(PSL)

0.049
13.700

1
1

0.825
0.000

Zinc

Δ(PSZ)≠→Δ(PPZ)
Δ(PPZ)≠→Δ(PSZ)

4.635
0.527

1
1

0.031
0.468

Copper

≠→ denotes does not Granger cause. The test procedure is based on the VECM estimated models
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IV. d. Volatility Transmission

Autoregressive conditional residual heteroskedasticity was established in table 5 only for
copper and lead. Volatility transmission over time and between primary and scrap prices is
captured though the MGARCH volatility representation produced by the residuals of the VECM
models. Since there is no autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity in the residuals of zinc
prices, information spillover within and between the primary and scrap markets is captured only
in terms of price levels and not through volatility spillovers. All the parameters of the bivariate
GARCH model for zinc were insignificant with the exception of the constant which would
correspond to its unconditional volatility.9
The MGARCH model results for copper and lead are presented in table 11. The presence
of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity in lead and copper prices is confirmed by the
significance of the estimated parameters. The estimated coefficients quantify the effects of the
lagged own and cross innovations (ARCH elements indicating the effect of past shocks) and the
lagged own and cross volatility persistence (GARCH elements indicating the effect of past
volatility) on the conditional volatility of primary and scrap prices. In the case of copper, 78
percent (14 out of 18) of the estimated ARCH coefficients and 61 percent (11 out of 18) of the
estimated GARCH coefficients were statistically significant. In the case of lead, 33 percent
(2 out of 6) of the estimated ARCH coefficients and 100 percent (6 out of 6) of the estimated
GARCH coefficients were statistically significant.
Strong own ARCH effects are present mostly in the primary markets. Own lagged
volatility effects are significant in explaining both primary and scrap price volatility. The only
exception is old copper scrap prices, where own instability information comes from past own
innovation influences and not from lagged volatility effects.
9

The results are not presented because they do not provide any further information.
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Table 11. Multivariate GARCH Models By Metal
Copper
hPP, t
c
2

ε P,t-1
εP, t-1εS1, t-1
ε2S1, t-1
ε2S2, t-1
εP, t-1εS2, t-1
εS1, t-1εS2, t-1
hPP, t-1
hS1P, t-1
hS1S1, t-1
hS2S2, t-1
hS2P, t-1
hS2S1, t-1

Volatility
Persistence
Log Likelihood

hS1S1, t

Lead
hPP, t

hS2S2, t

0

0.001

0.001

(1.151)

(2.999)***

(2.048)**

0.118

0.136

0.19

(1.665)**

(1.644)**

(1.395)*

-0.462

0.15

0.27

(-2.004)**

(0.961)

(1.733)**

c
2

ε P, t-1
εP, t-1 ε S, t-1
ε2S, t-1

hss, t

0

0

(0.757)

(1.530)*

0.187

0.011

(2.786)***

(0.42)

-0.036

0.022

(-1.418)*

(0.909)

0.002

0.011

0.452

0.041

0.096

(1.958)**

(0.507)

(0.961)

(0.679)

(0.995)

0.248

0.258

0.498

-

-

(2.641)***

(1.720)**

(4.174)***

0.342

-0.375

-0.615

-

-

(2.927)***

(-1.988)**

(-2.263)**

-0.669

-0.207

-0.438

-

-

(-2.487)***

(-0.815)

(-1.747)**

0.593

0.004

0.069

0.812

0.024

(2.8409)***

(0.397)

(1.619)*

(38.796)***

(1.741)**

0.106

-0.308

(4.576)***

(-3.331)***

0.003

0.98

1.81

0.189

0.379

(13.689)***

(0.792)

(2.619)***

hPP, t-1
hSP, t-1
hSS t-1

1.38

2.292

0.521

(2.503)***

(27.018)***

(3.305)***

(2.214)**

(28.796)***

1.014

0.605

0

-

-

(4.242)***

(10.126)***

(0.047)

-1.552

-0.097

-0.004

-

-

(-9.586)***

(-0.769)

(-0.092)

-2.366
(-3.187)***

-2.354
(-16.314)***

-0.012
(-0.092)

-

-

0.908

0.643

0.955

1.074

0.741

1348.3

Volatility
Persistence
Log Likelihood

709.67

Since the coefficients are nonlinear functions of the BEKK parameters the standard deviations are estimated based
on a Taylor Series approximation around the mean (Greene, 2000). Additionally, because of the large sample
approximation z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at *--0.10, **--0..05, ***--0.01
level.
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Spillover effects are significant both in terms of past innovation spillovers and past
volatility spillovers. They are exhibited both directly and indirectly, i.e. in terms of direct
volatility and innovation influences and co-volatility and co-innovations affects, respectively.
The indirect influence is larger than the direct influence of primary to scrap prices, especially in
GARCH terms. For copper, the direct and indirect information spillover in the primary market
from the scrap markets are of relatively similar importance. In the case of lead, volatility
spillover comes mostly indirectly, both for scrap and primary prices.
In the copper market, the coefficients of volatility spillover in terms of past variance and
covariance from the scrap to the primary market are substantial, ranging from1.08 (hS2S2) to -0.36
(hS2S1). The GARCH spillovers of primary to scrap prices range from 0.004 (hPP on hS1S1) to 0.37
(hS1P on hS2S2). Volatility spillover from primary to scrap prices is higher in terms of innovations,
ranging from 0.136 (ε2P on hS1S1) to 0.615 (εPεS2 on hS2S2). However, the ARCH effects of scrap on
primary copper volatility are again more considerable, extending from 0.25(ε2S2) to 0.67 (εS1εS2).
Old and new scrap covariance spillover is substantial in the new scrap volatility as well. In the
lead market, transmission of shocks passes from the scrap to the primary market; coinnovations
have only a small effect on primary volatility. GARCH spillovers, exhibited though covariances,
are more significant: 0.11 in the primary market and 0.31 in the scrap market.
Measuring both positive and negative spillovers by summation of the absolute spillover
coefficients, 91 percent of primary copper volatility movements comes from scrap price
spillovers, while 87 percent of primary lead volatility is explained by its own past volatility.
Spillovers from the primary market explain 27 percent of lead scrap price volatility. In the case
of new copper scrap, spillover accounts for 65 percent of volatility, of which only 11 percent
comes from primary market information and another 11 percent comes from primary and old
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scrap price comovements. Old copper volatility exhibits a higher degree of influence from the
market at 83 percent of which 33 percent comes from primary price influences, 41 percent comes
from new scrap price influences and 25 percent comes from primary and new scrap price
comovements.
Table 11 also includes estimates of the volatility persistence for primary and scrap prices.
Volatility persistence is measured by adding up the coefficients in each volatility equation. This
provides information about the importance of past shocks and volatility in the formation of future
conditional variance. The smaller the persistence, the faster the volatility returns to its
unconditional variance. No persistence, as in the case of zinc, means that the long-run
(unconditional) variance of the series constitutes the forecasts of future volatility.
The results show that the effects of shocks are more persistent in the case of primary
prices relative to the case of new scrap prices, but less persistent relative to old scrap prices. For
lead, volatility is not only more persistent in primary prices relative to scrap prices, but in the
case of primary lead, it is equal to one. This means that primary lead has an integrated GARCH
(IGARCH) process, which implies that the volatility of a series is permanently affected by
shocks and the unconditional volatility is infinite. To formally test nonstationarity of the lead
volatility system, the eigenvalues of the estimated A ⊗ A + G ⊗ G are computed. Table 12 shows
that one eigenvalue is greater than unity: thus, the system is weakly non-stationary. Nelson
(1990), however, notes that strict stationarity exists, and thus the IGARCH can be estimated like
any other GARCH model.
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Table 12. Weak Stationarity Test for the Lead Volatility Model
Moduli of Eigenvalues
for A ⊗ A + G ⊗ G
λ1
λ2
λ3
λ4

1.0059
0.9543+0.8797i
0.9543-0.8797i
0.9513

V. Conclusions
This investigation empirically assessed the direction of influence between primary and
scrap prices in terms of both levels and volatility. The first result is that primary and scrap prices
hold a long run relationship and cannot wander arbitrarily far away from each other. In the long
run, primary prices are found to be weakly exogenous. This means that scrap prices do not aid in
long run primary price forecasting. In the cases of lead and zinc, the results also imply that scrap
prices follow primary prices. Since the fundamentals of primary markets direct the market, this
implication is in accordance with the demand pull theory. For copper, exogeneity of the primary
price does not suffice for it to lead the market since old scrap prices are weakly exogenous as
well; the copper market is driven by both primary and secondary components.
The fact that scrap prices hold a long run relationship to primary prices also implies that
unusual short run interactions between scrap and primary prices are only transitory. This
implication is significant in combination with the fact that the rate of adjustment of scrap prices
to their long run relationship with primary prices is relatively slow: short run conditions can
persist and create misguiding signals for market participants. The impressive rise of prices in the
period of 1994 to 1995 and the spikes of 1995 that occurred in all recycled material markets led
to many hopeful investments in the recycling business. The optimism created by these market
movements was deceptive and led to many bankruptcies (Ackerman and Gallagher, 2002) as
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recycled material prices eventually return to their co-integrating relationship to primary prices.
Decisions for investments in recycling should be based on the long run role of recycled materials
in the primary markets, not on temporary phenomena.
Short run price spillovers were evaluated as well. The results indicate that short run
effects are not necessarily the same as long run influences. Although short run primary lead price
changes “Granger cause” scrap price changes, price spillovers in the zinc market are contradirectional. Information spillovers in the short run copper market are directed from the primary
to the new and old scrap market and from the new scrap market to the primary market. However,
short run Granger causality holds only from primary to new scrap prices and from new scrap
prices to old scrap prices. Additionally, since price spillovers are not statistically important over
one lag, the results show that information assimilation is rapid in both the primary and scrap
prices.
These results show that the direction of price spillovers is unrelated to the recycling rate
in the market. Prices of scrap zinc, which provides only 25 percent of apparent zinc supply, lead
primary prices in the short run, whereas prices of scrap lead, which constitutes 70 percent of
apparent lead supply, is ”Granger caused” by primary lead prices. That scrap prices may lead
short run primary prices does not signify that scrap metal is the primary force in the market. In
the case of zinc, for example, recycling constitutes only a very small portion of the market. A
phenomenon of scrap prices leading primary prices could imply that secondary prices are more
sensitive to changes in the market, capture these influences earlier than primary prices, and later
transmit this information to the primary market which in turn reacts with primary price changes.
Interactions between primary and scrap prices were found to differ in the three markets
examined. Although the results for some markets support the assumption of price spillovers only
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from the primary to the scrap market (an assumption used in many past studies of primary and
scrap price interactions), the results obtained indicate that such an assumption a priori would
lead to substantial information loss.
Past studies of primary and scrap interrelations have assumed that market signals are
transmitted only through prices and ignored volatility influences (Ross, 1989). This analysis
shows that information transmission between primary and scrap markets occurs in terms of both
prices and volatility spillovers in the cases of copper and lead. In the zinc market, information
spillover within and between the primary and scrap markets is captured only in terms of price
levels spillovers.
Volatility spillovers are exhibited both directly and indirectly, i.e. in terms of direct
volatility and innovation influences and covolatility and coinnovations affects, respectively. The
indirect influence is larger than the direct influence of primary to scrap prices, especially in terms
of past covariance. Additionally, information comes from both past innovation spillovers and
past volatility spillovers. However, there is a distinct pattern in the time it takes for shocks in the
primary market to pass to the scrap market. In the copper market, a specific shock in the primary
market increases the scrap market volatilities through ARCH spillovers; therefore the rate of
transmission is rapid. In the lead market, an unanticipated event in the primary market does not
have a significant effect on the scrap market; however, as the volatility in the primary market
increases because of the anticipated event, this increase in volatility is later transmitted to scrap
prices. Moreover, with the exception of old copper scrap, the study finds volatility persistence to
be higher for primary than for scrap markets.
In the copper market, volatility and shock spillovers from the scrap to the primary prices
is higher than the spillovers that flow from the primary to the scrap prices. For lead, volatility
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spillovers explain the conditional volatility of prices to a lower degree, but the pattern and degree
of spillovers is more uniform between the primary and the scrap markets. The findings on
volatility transmission also suggest that when taking into account both first and second price
moments, information transmission is bidirectional – price influences are experienced from the
primary to the secondary market, as well as from the secondary to the primary market even
when transmission is unidirectional in terms of price levels. In other words, any change affecting
the primary or scrap market sets in motion reactions in both primary and secondary components
of the metal market. These results are especially important when one considers that the rate of
transmission of information to a market is primarily indicated by the volatility of its price (Ross,
1989).
Finally, given that modeling time-varying volatility can produce more accurate price
forecasts, incorporating volatility links between primary and scrap prices could provide
significant information for anticipating primary and secondary price changes in the cases where
volatility transmission is substantial. As an example, around ninety percent of primary copper
price volatility is explained by volatility in the scrap market which means that primary copper
market participants can benefit from following what is happening in the scrap market.
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CHAPTER 4: ESSAY 3
Time-Varying Ratios of Primary and Scrap Metal Prices:
The Importance of Inventories
Abstract
Although metal markets are subject to short run disequilibria and metal prices follow an
adjustment mechanism over time, the links between primary and scrap metal prices have been
assumed constant. This study explores potential primary and scrap price relationships using time
series methodology applied to aluminum, copper, lead, and zinc prices for the period 1984-2000.
The results show that even though a long run equilibrium between primary and scrap prices
exists, persistent short run dynamics lead to unstable relationships in the short run. The short run
relationships between primary and scrap prices, expressed through the ratios of primary and
scrap prices, are stronger in some periods than others. A model which relates the ratio of primary
and scrap prices to levels of primary metal stocks is proposed and evaluated. The model shows
that inventories are positively related to the ratios of primary to scrap prices and provides a key
to understanding the adjustment mechanisms between scrap and primary prices.
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I. Introduction
Recycled materials act both as inputs into the production of and as substitutes for refined
primary materials. As a consequence, fluctuations in demand and supply in the recycled material
markets both influence and are influenced by the primary material markets. These links are
evident in terms of prices which express the market information available at every point in time.
In the seventies and eighties, many studies examined links between primary and scrap
metal fundamentals, including prices, through structural modeling. Fisher and Owen (1981)
expressed explicit structural relationships for scrap and primary aluminium and indicated a
connection between primary and scrap prices. Employing a traditional structural analysis,
Hashimoto (1983) argued that steel price fluctuations and co-movements of primary and scrap
steel prices are due to the industry’s inherent inelasticities and its sensitivity to the business
cycle. Stollery (1983) modeled the demand and supply relationships between scrap, primary
input, and primary output for copper and steel. His empirical model of copper showed that the
scrap price varies in direct proportion to the primary London Metal Exchange (LME) price.
Although some studies found intertemporal linkages between primary and scrap prices,
they assumed that the relationship was stable. The majority of studies examining primary and
scrap price links have been based on the concept of rapid market clearing. To the contrary, metal
markets are known to be inelastic in the short run and to follow flow and stock adjustment
processes towards equilibrium. As a consequence, disequilibrium between primary and scrap
prices has, to a great extent, been overlooked in the literature. It has been acknowledged only in
Stollery’s (1983) and Taylor’s (1979) studies of the difference between primary and scrap copper
prices – mostly as an investigation of the refiner’s margin – and in the annual studies of copper

- 81 -

recycling from USGS1 which also include an examination of the difference between primary and
scrap copper prices.
Understanding the changing character of primary and scrap price links is very important,
not only for those involved in the recycling sector but for those involved with the primary metal
market since greater than 50 percent of the industry’s supply comes from recycling (USGS,
2000). This study revives the interest in primary and scrap market links and shows, through time
series methods, that the relationship between primary and scrap prices is not constant over time
but dependent upon market forces.
The study shows that primary and scrap prices hold a long run equilibrium relationship,
but that their short run interaction is unstable. This information should be invaluable to metal
products manufacturers as well as to dealers in scrap metal because their optimal long run and
short run choices are often different. The changing relationship of the spread between primary
and scrap prices is described in terms of their price ratios. Price ratios reflect both equilibrium
and disequilibrium adjustments and are closely related to price differences2 which have provided
the only reference to short run disequilibrium between primary and scrap prices in past studies.
Price ratios vary over time but the price ratio series are mean-reverting in many cases. The mean
reversion of primary to scrap price ratios is important for scrap metal markets since it implies
that policies which try to promote recycling through price manipulations may be able to decrease
the spread between primary and scrap prices in the short term but may not lead to sustainable
results.
In addition, the analysis demonstrates that price ratio fluctuations are related to market
conditions and to the physical availability of metal in the market as reflected in inventory levels.

1
2

Multiple years.
For example PS – aPP = 0 is identical to PS/PP = a.
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Thus, increasing the role of scrap in metal markets through technological improvements and
higher market integration could have a stronger impact on scrap demand and supply than pricebased policies. The theoretical explanation for the relationship between price ratios and
inventories is provided by the production-smoothing incentives of metal producers which lead to
tighter connections between primary and scrap prices when inventories are lower than when
inventories are higher. In a tight market, the spread between primary and scrap prices becomes
smaller. When supply is ample, as indicated by high inventory accumulation, the spread between
primary and scrap prices becomes wider. Establishment of this relationship provides market
participants with valuable insight into the relative behaviour of the primary and scrap metal
sectors by allowing them to anticipate and forecast primary to scrap price spreads.

II. Primary and Scrap Price Behavior
II. a. Primary and Scrap Prices

Four metal markets are analyzed – aluminium, copper, lead, and zinc – utilizing United
States average monthly prices for the period of 1984-20003. Primary prices represent values for
refined metal which can be produced either from primary ore/concentrate or scrap metal. The
primary prices used are the producer price of primary aluminum (PPA), the producer price of
delivered copper cathode (PPC), the New York delivery prices of the primary producers’ pig
lead (PPL), and the domestic and foreign producer prices for primary zinc slab delivered in the
United States (PPZ)4.
Commercial scrap metal can be divided into new and old scrap. New scrap, such as
cuttings and turnings, is generated during processing and fabrication of metal products and is
3

The case of aluminum is studied for the period of 1985-2000, and the case of zinc for the period 1984-1996.
PPA and PPC were obtained from the United States Geological Survey specialists P. Plunkert and D.L Edelstein
respectively. PPL is published in the Commodity Research Bureau Commodity Yearbook, and PPZ is available in
the Metal Statistics publication of the American Metal Market. The length of each time series is determined by data
availability and compatibility.
4
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usually denoted as No.1 scrap. It is desirable for its higher quality and for its consistency in
terms of content and supply. New scrap prices included in the study are for aluminum clippings
(PS1A), for brass mills No. 1 copper scrap (PS1C), and for new zinc clippings (PSZ). Old scrap,
usually labelled No. 2 scrap, is metal incorporated in post-consumer products, obsolete
manufactured products, or spent materials. Old scrap prices in the study are for old sheet and cast
aluminum (PS2A), the producer price for aluminum used beverage can scrap (PS3A), the price
for refiners’ No.2 copper scrap (PS2C), and the smelters’ buying price for heavy soft scrap lead
(PSL)5.
The primary and scrap prices in each market are presented in figure 1 while table 1 shows
their time series characteristics including Phillips and Perron [P-P] (1988) unit root tests that
indicate that the price series are integrated of order one, i.e. I(1). Appendix A provides an
explanation of the relationship between primary and scrap prices by averaging their mean and
volatility over three-year periods. Primary and scrap prices move in the same direction but are
not always in correspondence.The degree of variation is higher for scrap prices in terms of
coefficients of variation with the exception of aluminium cans and new scrap copper. Primary
and scrap prices are interrelated. However, in contrast to past studies which assume
instantaneous and simultaneous reactions, this description indicates that the links between
primary and secondary prices are not constant over time. The differing degree of price variation
for primary and scrap metals is an indication that the short-term primary and secondary price
changes are not always synchronous. Both primary and secondary markets adjust to exogenous
and endogenous changes with time lags and can be subject to disequilibrium conditions in their

5

The Metal Statistics publication of the American Metal Market is the source for PS1A, PS2A, PSL, and PSZ. We
obtained PS1C and PS2C from the United States Geological Survey specialist D.L. Edelstein, and PS3A from the
Commodity Research Bureau Commodity Yearbook. The length of each time series is determined by data
availability and compatibility.
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own market or in relation to each other, at least in the short term. As can be seen in figure 2, the
price ratios of primary and secondary metals show that the relationship between primary and
scrap prices is not constant over time.

Table 1. Characteristics of Primary and Scrap Prices by Metal
Characteristic

Mean
Standard
Deviation
Coef. of Variation
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera (J-B)
Probability (J-B)
P-P Unit Root Test
Levels
Probability*
First Differences
Probability*
1% Critical Value
5% Critical Value

PS3A
50.30

Price Series
Copper
PPC PS1C PS2C
98.43 88.80 75.02

Lead
PPL
PSL
37.96 15.61

Zinc
PPZ
PSZ
53.58 31.30

11.38

24.86

22.00

19.73

9.24

4.86

13.45

10.44

0.229
1.005
4.116
42.26
0.000

0.267 0.284 0.226
0.161 -0.056 0.260
2.759 2.456 2.196
1.29
2.47
7.34
0.524 0.291 0.025

0.253
0.284
2.089
9.80
0.007

0.248
0.003
1.783
12.60
0.002

0.263
0.019
1.665
15.16
0.001

0.243
-0.519
2.306
13.24
0.001

0.312
-0.159
2.534
2.70
0.259

0.251
0.997
3.477
27.32
0.000

0.334
0.277
2.680
2.66
0.264

-2.262
0.186
-10.55
0.000
-3.465
-2.877

-2.220
0.200
-10.17
0.000
-3.465
-2.877

-2.251
0.189
-10.56
0.000
-3.462
-2.876

-2.063
0.260
-12.08
0.000
-3.462
-2.876

-2.081
0.253
-11.90
0.000
-3.462
-2.876

-1.614
0.474
-10.86
0.000
-3.462
-2.876

-2.017
0.280
-11.60
0.000
-3.462
-2.876

-1.888
0.337
-7.50
0.000
-3.473
-2.880

-1.939
0.314
-10.07
0.000
-3.473
-2.880

PPA
70.66

Aluminum
PS1A PS2A
49.74 43.45

16.16

13.29

12.36

-2.244
0.192
-9.84
0.000
-3.465
-2.877

-2.244
0.192
-9.21
0.000
-3.465
-2.877

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root
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Figure 1. Primary and Scrap Price Series by Metal
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Figure 2. Primary and Scrap Price Ratios by Metal
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II. b. Primary and Secondary Price Relationships

On average, one would expect the spread between the primary price and the scrap price to
simply reflect the refinery margin. In the short run, however, changes in the primary prices may
not completely explain changes in the scrap prices because constraints do not always allow
market clearing (Taylor, 1979). Cointegration analysis has established that variables may have an
equilibrium relationship in the long run as explained by economic theory even though
disequilibria in the short term are possible. Specifically, Engle and Granger (1987) point out that
a linear combination of two or more non-stationary series may be stationary. If such a stationary
linear combination exists, the non-stationary time series are said to be cointegrated. The
stationary linear combination is called the cointegrating equation and is interpreted as a long-run
equilibrium relationship between the variables. If two variables are cointegrated, they cannot
move too far away from each other. In contrast, a lack of cointegration suggests that such
variables have no long run link and can wander arbitrarily far away from each other.
Since the primary and scrap prices in each market are non-stationary of order one [I(1)]
(table 1), cointegration testing allows for the establishment of a long run equilibrium relationship
between primary and scrap prices even though short run price dynamics may reflect
disequilibrium. The Johansen (1991, 1995) cointegration tests reveal not only the long run
relationship but also short run dynamic information based on the Vector Error Correction
(VECM) models that are produced.
Johansen’s method tests the restrictions imposed by cointegration on the unrestricted
Vector Autoregression (VAR) model involving k series. For primary and scrap prices the
unrestricted VAR is

Pt = A1 Pt −1 + ... + Ap Pt − p + εt ,
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where Pt is a vector including one primary and one scrap price series (both non-stationary I(1)
variables), and εt is a vector of innovations. The VAR is transformed in the following VECM:
p −1

ΔPt = Π Pt −1 + ∑ Γi ΔPt −i + εt ,

p

p

i =1

j = i +1

where Π = ∑ Ai − Ii , Γi = − ∑ Aj

i =1

Granger’s representation theorem (Johansen, 1991; Engle and Granger, 1987) asserts that
if the coefficient matrix Π has reduced rank r < 2 for the bivariate case, then there exist 2 × r
matrices α and β each with rank r such that Π = αβ' and β'Pt-1 is stationary. In the bivariate case
there can be at most one independent combination of the variables in Pt (β'Pt-1) that is stationary.
The variable, r, is the number of cointegrating relations; in the bivariate case the cointegrating
rank cannot be larger than one. Each column of β is the cointegrating vector (characterizing the
long run relationship between the primary and scrap price), and the elements of α are known as
the adjustment parameters of primary and scrap prices to their cointegrating (long run)
relationship.
The cointegrating term is also known as the error correction term since the deviation from
long run equilibrium between primary and scrap prices is corrected gradually through a series of
short run price adjustments towards this equilibrium. The adjustment rates measure the speed of
adjustment of the short run changes of prices to their long-run relationship and show the
persistence of short run disequilibrium conditions.
The cointegration analysis6 is presented in table 2. The first five columns show the
cointegration test results. The sixth column shows the long run relationship between the primary
and scrap price for each pair. The last two columns show the adjustment rates of the price
changes to their cointegrating relationship. Primary prices are found to hold a long run
6

Eviews (version 5.1) was used for parameter estimation.
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relationship to scrap prices with the exception of old and new aluminum prices. The primary
products of old and new scrap aluminum, cast aluminum products, are sold in markets that are
separate from those of primary aluminum and, as a consequence, it is not inconsistent that these
scrap prices are not found to have a long run relationship to primary aluminum prices.

Table 2. Evidence of Cointegration between Primary and Scrap Prices by Metal
Prices
Aluminum
PPA,PS1A

PPA,PS2A

PPA,PS3A

Copper
PPC,PS1C

Ho: r=p

Zinc
PPZ,PSZ

Trace Test

Cointegrating

Adjustment Rates (α)

Statistic Prob.^^

Relationship (β΄Pt-1)

Primary Price Scrap Price

Statistic

Prob.^^

p=0

10.28

0.310

16.99

0.133

p≤1

6.71

0.142

6.71

0.142

p=0

6.66

0.711

11.47

0.498

p≤ 1

4.81

0.305

4.81

0.305

p=0

15.35^

0.009

15.38^

p≤ 1

0.03

0.892

0.03

p=0

28.33^

0.000

28.36^

p≤ 1

0.04

0.871

0.04

26.63^

0.001

30.73^

4.1

0.398

4.1

p=0

26.13^

0.005

32.10^

p≤ 1

5.96

0.465

5.96

p=0

18.09^

0.022

20.87^

p≤ 1

2.78

0.622

2.78

PPC,PS2C

Lead
PPL,PSL

Max. Eigenvalue Test

0.015 PPA t-1 - 1.41PS3At-1
0.892

(-51.43)***

0.000 PS1C t-1 -0.9PPC t-1
0.871

(-124.18)***

0.001 PS2C t-1 -0.82PPC t-1+5.66
0.398

(-26.77)*** (1.83)*

0.007 PSL t-1 -0.65*PPL t-1+0.03t+5.4
0.465

(-7.99)***

(2.23)**

0.041 PPZ t-1-1.24*PSZ t-1-13.86
0.622

(-6.28)*** (-2.14)**

^denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
^^MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values

t-statistics in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at *--0.10, **--0..05, ***--0.01 level.
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-0.06
(-1.39)

0.06
(1.89)*

0.16

-0.16

(1.49)

(-1.84)*

0.15

-0.14

(1.37)

(-1.76)*

-0.01

-0.14

(-0.11)

(-5.02)***

-0.02

0.08

(-0.87)

(4.15)***

In relation to the short run disequilibrium between primary and scrap prices, results show
that the adjustment rates of primary and scrap prices to their cointegrating relationship are not
high7. This suggests that short run disequilibrium movements can be persistent and denotes the
importance of understanding the short-term relationships between primary and scrap prices. In
addition, adjustment rates are statistically significant only for scrap prices. This means that most
of the adjustment towards the long run relationship between primary and scrap prices is borne by
adjustments in the scrap market.

III. Primary to Scrap Price Ratios
To examine the time-varying spread between primary and secondary prices, the analysis
relies on price ratios. Cointegration analysis separates the disequilibrium dynamics from the
equilibrium adjustments of the primary and scrap prices. By using price ratios it is possible to
include both disequilibrium and equilibrium adjustments that occur between primary and scrap
prices. The close relationship between price ratios and price differentials provides the connection
of the vector error correction models of the primary and scrap prices analyzed above to their
price ratios. As Granger indicated in his 2003 Nobel Prize Lecture, “a potentially useful property of
forecasts based on cointegration is that when extended some way ahead, the forecasts of the two series
will form a constant ratio” (Granger, 2004: p. 362).

The secondary/primary price ratio indicates the relative attractiveness of choosing
secondary versus primary inputs in the production process and is an explanatory factor for
recycling rates (Van Beukering and Bouman, 2001). Price ratios are also important for secondary
smelters and refineries (producing primary metal mainly from scrap) since their profitability and
survival depends on the price margin between scrap and the refined primary output. In this

7

The speed of adjustment can range from zero to one.
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context, Taylor (1979) used the relative scrap to primary price ratio in explaining primary prices.
The time varying relationship between primary and scrap prices was analysed by Fowler (1937),
who took an interest in iron ore and steel scrap price ratios relative to their consumption ratios
for producing steel and found that there were differences in the elasticity of substitution between
different periods.
The primary to scrap price ratios are presented in figure 2. Appendix A includes a
summary of the price ratios data by averaging over three-year periods. Table 3 shows their time
series characteristics, including Phillips and Perron (1988) unit root tests. The following
conclusions can be drawn for primary to scrap price ratios:
(i). The means of the price ratios are not consistent over the twenty-year period. In some
periods scrap prices are closer, indicating a stronger relationship to the primary metal
prices relative to other periods.
(ii). The price ratios are stationary in many cases and the evidence favors a constant mean.
This supports the finding already indicated through cointegration analysis that the
primary and scrap prices tend to revert to a long run relationship.
(iii). The temporal patterns of price ratio means and volatility differ between markets. In
addition, the temporal patterns of the price ratios within each market are similar for
different types of scrap. This would suggest that a market specific explanation of the
price ratio behaviour is indicated.
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Table 3. Characteristics of Primary to Scrap Price Ratios by Metal
Characteristic

Mean
Standard Deviation
Coef. of Variation
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera (J-B)
Probability (J-B)

PPA
PS1A
1.456
0.223
0.153
1.46
3.905
74.743
0.000

Aluminum
PPA
PS2A
1.692
0.35
0.207
1.431
3.77
70.283
0.000

P-P Unit Root Test
Levels
Probability*
First Differences
Probability*
1% Critical Value
5% Critical Value

-1.853
0.354
-14.75
0.000
-3.465
-2.877

-1.783
0.388
-13.50
0.000
-3.465
-2.877

Price Ratio Series
Copper
PPA
PPC
PPC
PS3A
PS1C
PS2C
1.411
1.11
1.319
0.1
0.053
0.071
0.071
0.048
0.054
0.824
1.313
0.463
4.013
7.304
3.523
29.919
216.126
9.603
0.000
0.000
0.008

Lead
PPL
PSL
2.517
0.381
0.151
0.487
2.965
8.069
0.018

Zinc
PPZ
PSZ
1.821
0.477
0.262
1.046
3.154
28.626
0.000

-4.086
0.001
-3.465
-2.877

-3.410
0.012
-3.462
-2.876

-1.468
0.133
-10.17
0.000
-2.58
-1.943

-6.623
0.000
-3.462
-2.876

-5.839
0.000
-3.462
-2.876

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root

III. a. Inventory Influences

Market fundamentals allow an understanding of the behaviour of primary to scrap price
ratios. Low price ratios seeming to reflect tight supply/demand balances (low stock levels)
suggest that market fundamentals do influence the spread between primary and scrap prices. The
graphs and time series characteristics of the inventory series (in logarithmic form) for the period
1984-2000 are presented in figure 3 and table 4 respectively8. Periods of low price ratios
coincided with periods of low market inventories. For aluminium, the price ratio was low during
1988, 1990, 1993, 1996-1997, and 1999-2000, all periods of low inventories. For lead, low price
8

The inventories used are United States stocks at the end of each month. Aluminum stock data was available only
for North America. The source for the North American Aluminium stocks, denoted in the paper, as USAS, is the
International Aluminum Institute. The Copper stocks (USCS) where estimated from segregated US copper stocks
compiled by the United States Geological Survey specialist, D.L. Edelstein. The Metal Statistics publication of the
American Metal Markets provided the source for lead (USLS) and zinc (USZS) stocks. The length of each time
series is determined by data availability and compatibility.
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ratios were experienced in the low inventory periods of 1984-1985, 1988, 1991. In contrast, the
periods of 1985-1986, 1986-1987, and 1995-96 had high inventory accumulation with high lead
price ratios. Examination of the effect of supply influences on the spread between primary and
scrap prices brings to light that short zinc supply in 1987-1989 was accompanied by low price
ratios while worldwide supply shortages of aluminium in 1986-1988 coincided with high price
ratios. The reason for this inconsistency in the relation of price ratios to supply is that supply
shortages for aluminium during 1986-1988 where buffered by drawing from the industry’s high
inventories. Shortages for zinc in 1987-1989, however, coincided with low zinc inventories.
Furthermore, it is noted that reduced demand in 2000 was accompanied by increased ratios,
except in the case of aluminium, where the period was characterised by a reduction in inventories
and the price ratios were low.

Table 4. Characteristics of US Metal Stocks
Inventory Series

Characteristic
Mean
Standard Deviation
Coef. of Variation
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera (J-B)
Probability (J-B)
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test
Levels
Probability*
First Difereences
Probability*
1% Critical Value
5% Critical Value

lnUSAS
7.390
0.167
0.023
0.059
3.356
1.117
0.572

lnUSCS
4.377
0.449
0.102
1.391
4.211
75.151
0.000

lnUSLS
3.360
0.795
0.237
-0.017
2.035
7.929
0.019

lnUSZS
9.165
0.693
0.076
1.250
3.168
40.782
0.000

-1.666
0.763
-11.19
0.000
-4.007
-3.434

-2.916
0.045
-3.464
-2.876

-2.641
0.087
-3.462
-2.876

-1.828
0.366
-11.98
0.000
-3.473
-2.880

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root
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Figure 3. Metal Stocks (in logarithmic form)
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It appears that the major determinant of price ratios is the tightness in the market,
represented by inventory availability. Scatter plots of price ratios to United State inventories
presented in figures 4-7 attest to a positive relationship between price ratios and inventories. The
plots also include a line of fit to improve interpretation of the relationship that connects them.
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Figure 4. Scatter Plot of the Price Ratio of Primary to
Old Scrap Copper (PPC/PS2C) to Copper Inventories
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Figure 7. Scatter Plot of the Price Ratio of Primary to Old
Scrap Lead (PPL/PSL) to Lead Inventories*

IV. Modeling Price Ratios
IV. a. Nature of Inventories

Stocks are a major factor in metal markets. They provide the intertemporal link in
dynamic commodity systems and form the basis of price adjustment since demand and supply
are inelastic (Labys and Kaboudan, 1980). Primary and scrap metal demand and supply do not
always clear (D=S) in the short-term due to technological, institutional and psychological
constraints. The discrepancy between supply and demand is then carried over to the subsequent
period through inventory changes. When the market is in a period of excess supply, in which
metal production exceeds metal demand, the excess is added to the accumulated stocks. When
demand exceeds supply, stocks are drawn down to cover the excess demand. Current inventories
are defined as the summation of supply and demand changes as well as inventory accumulation
carried over from the past periods:
*

lagged by one month.
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I p ,t = I p ,t -1 + S p ,t - D p ,t

(1)

Thus, inventories express market conditions, both as current flow changes and as past
accumulation of stocks. Consequently, they can allow inferences about how market conditions
influence primary and secondary prices.
The role of inventories emphasizes the dynamic character of metal markets and indicates
the disequilibrium forces that are embodied in the market. It would be expected that the
disequilibrium between primary and scrap prices be related to a variable (such as inventories)
that embodies disequilibrium conditions. In addition, stocks are a determinant of both primary
and scrap prices.
When demand and supply are inelastic, as is the case in metal markets, a stock
adjustment process determines primary metal price behaviour. Taylor (1979) introduced the
influence of stocks on scrap prices as well in his short run model of the copper industry. Since
both primary and scrap prices are explained by inventories, the ratio of primary to scrap prices
should also be influenced by inventories. This is especially obvious if it is taken into account that
the reactions of primary and scrap prices to market forces will be different and come with
different adjustment rates.
IV. b. The Production Smoothing Model

Production smoothing is an explanation for the use of stocks in inelastic markets. It
points out that adjusting production to changes of demand would be accompanied by high
adjustment costs. This stems from the high investment cost in production expansion and the
rigidity of electricity, primary input and labor contracts. In addition, it acknowledges that firms
face convex production cost curves and fluctuating market demand. Under such conditions, firms
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have incentives to use inventories to buffer demand shocks and smooth production (Holt et al.,
1960) or production costs (Eichenbaum, 1984, 1989).
In the presence of low demand, excess supply is stored as inventory in order to avoid
production cuts and consequent adjustment cost; in periods of high demand, difficulties and
increased costs resulting from higher production can be avoided by absorbing buffer stocks.
Capacity is unlikely to be expanded or contracted in the short run; expansion (contraction) would
occur only when clear (but often misleading) signals of long-term increasing (decreasing) prices
unfold. Based on the incentives for production smoothing, low stocks, indicating high demand
and short supply in the market, would also lead to the utilization of relatively more scrap than
usual as a metal input or substitute. The cost of disrupting the flow of operations is linked to the
use of primary ore and concentrate: scrap, which is a more flexible input than primary ore, can
be used to smooth production and production costs.
In periods of excess demand, increased supply orders can easily be covered by scrap, and
higher marginal costs from the use of primary ore can be avoided. The relative use of scrap
directly from metal consumers, as a substitute for primary metal, also increases as the market
tightens and the primary metal industry is not able to respond swiftly to demand. Thus, when
inventories are low, the ratio of primary to secondary demand decreases, leading subsequently to
a smaller primary to scrap price ratio. In contrast during low demand, when stocks are high,
production and production cost-smoothing implies that relatively less scrap is used as input to
primary production. Ore and concentrate are preferred to scrap in order to avoid the idling of
production capacity. Although both primary and scrap demand are low when inventories are
high, their demand ratio widens and so does the primary to scrap price ratio. The first hypothesis
that arises from this analysis is that the ratio of primary to scrap metal prices is positively linked
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to inventories. However, technological, psychological, and institutional constraints in the market,
as well as the influence of expectations, could mean that the ratio of primary to scrap prices
adjusts to inventories over time. Therefore, it is expected that the positive relationship between
the ratios of primary to secondary metal prices and inventories occurs with time lags.
IV. c. Time Series Models

Since metal markets are characterized by stock adjustments and expectation functions,
the hypotheses are tested under a dynamic framework with autoregressive (ARMAX) models as
described in equation 2. Current and past inventories as well as lagged price ratios incorporate
information about the fundamentals of the market. The scatter plots in graphs 4-7 indicate that
the relationship between price ratios and inventories is asymmetric. Higher stocks lead to higher
ratios at a decreasing rate since the difference between the primary and scrap prices is
constrained by their technological and market relations. To express this asymmetry, inventories
are transformed into logarithms.
k

( Pp / Ps )t = c + φk ∑ ( Pp / Ps )t − k + γ ln I t + δ ln I t −1 + ε t

(2)

1

The ARMAX models explain the movement of a variable through time in terms of its
own past values as well as current and past values of other explanatory variables. Time and
relationships through time are an explicit part of the formulation. The lagged values of the price
ratios and inventories appear as a consequence of the theoretical basis of the model, which takes
into account past market information and allows economic agents to respond not only to current
values but to past values as well.
When price ratios and inventories are stationary, the number of lags is chosen based only
on the goodness of fit. When the price ratios are stationary, but inventories contain a unit root
[I(1)], as in the case of modeling the ratio of aluminum primary to used aluminum can prices,
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regression equations including only current inventories or only inventories lagged by one period
are meaningless because the error term contains a trend component. Including current and past
values allows the individual coefficients of log I t , log I t −1 to be written as coefficients of
stationary variables which implies that a t-statistic is appropriate for testing the influence of
log I t , log I t −1 individually on the price ratios (Sims, Stock and Watson, 1990). Specifically, the
distributions of the estimated coefficients γ and δ each converges at a rate corresponding to

T

to a Gaussian distribution. An F test of the joint hypothesis that γ and δ are both zero has a nonstationary limiting distribution and cannot be conducted, but it is possible to test the hypothesis
of γ=0 and δ=0 being asymptotically N (0,1) separately for each variable (Hamilton, 1994) .
When both price ratios and inventories are non-stationary [I(1)] it is necessary to check
whether a long run relationship exists between them. If cointegration is present, a Vector Error
Correction model is produced. This approach is followed for the primary to scrap zinc price ratio
as well as the ratios of primary to new and old aluminum scrap prices. The model of the price
ratios under this formulation is described by:
k

k

1

1

Δ ( Pp / Ps )t = c + a[( Pp / Ps )t −1 + β ln I t −1 ] + ∑ φk Δ ( Pp / Ps )t − k + ∑ γ k Δ ln I t −1 + ε t

(3)

In this model the relationship of inventories to price ratios is examined both in the long term and
in the short term.

V. Empirical Results
The empirical results of the price ratio models are presented in Table 59. The coefficients
differ considerably between metal markets. The functions of all the price ratios have significant

9

The tests for cointegration between primary/scrap price ratios and inventories for zinc and aluminum and their full
Vector Error Correction models are presented in appendix B. All computations were performed with E-views
(version 5.1)
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autoregressive coefficients. For the price ratios that are non-stationary, the autoregressive
coefficient is one. The significance of the autoregressive coefficients testifies to the dynamic
adjustment behavior of the metal markets.

Table 5. Models of Primary to Scrap Price Ratios
Δ(PPA/PS1A) t = - 0.065[PPA/PS1At-1 - 0.58lnUSASt-1 + 2.622] – 0.0007 + εt
(-2.682)∗
(-2.235)°
(-0.159)
2
Adj.R =0.032, AIC=-2.67

(4.1)

Δ(PPA/PS2A )t = - 0.046[PPA/PS2At-1 - 0.809lnUSASt-1 + 4.295] - 0.0003 + εt
(-2.216)°
(-1.730)^
(-0.059)
2
Adj.R =0.020, AIC=-2.03

(4.2)

PPA/PS3A t

(4.3)

PPC/PS1Ct = 1.052 + 0.541PPC/PS1Ct-1 + 0.179PPC/PS1Ct-2 - 0.013lnUSCS t-1
(12.508)∗ (7.500)∗
(2.469)°
(-0.635)
+ 0.027lnUSCSt-2 + εt
(1.274)
Adj.R2=0.466, AIC=-3.63

(4.4)

= 0.316 + 0.819PPA/PS3A t-1 - 0.307lnUSASt + 0.455lnUSASt-1+ εt
(0.339) (19.369)∗
(-1.682)^
(2.443)°
2
Adj.R =0.710, AIC=-2.97

PPC/PS1Ct = 1.109 + 0.497PPC/PS1Ct-1 + 0.234PPC/PS1Ct-2 + 0.048lnUSCSt-3 + ε t
(11.977)∗ (7.718)∗
(2.935)°
(2.286)°
2
Adj.R =0.533, AIC=-3.20

(4.5)

PPL/PSLt = 2.049 + 0.841(PPC/PS1C)t-1 + 0.141(lnUSLS)t-1 + ε t
(2.286)°
(11.044)∗ (21.569)∗
2
Adj.R =0.77, AIC=-0.58

(4.6)

Δ(PPZ/PSZ)t= - 0.135[PPZ/PSZt-1 - 0.554lnUSZSt-1 + 3.255] + 0.227Δ(PPZ/PSZ)t-1
(-5.250)∗
(3.352)∗ (2.829)∗
(-3.503)∗
+ 0.020Δ(PPZ/PSZ)t-2 + 0.036Δ(PPZ/PSZ)t-3 - 0.048Δ(lnUSZS)t-1
(0.242)
(0.428)
(-0.624)
- 0.121Δ(lnUSZS)t-2 - 0.126Δ(lnUSZS)t-3+ ε t
(-1.558)
(-1.640)
Adj.R2=0.105, AIC=-0.76
t-statistics in parentheses: ^ indicates significance at 0.10 level, ° indicates significance at 0.05 level, ∗ indicates
significance at 0.01 level.
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(4.7)

The effect of inventories on the primary/secondary price ratios is positive. Even though
present inventory levels have a negative effect on the ratio of primary to used aluminum can
prices, past values of inventories have a positive effect which surpasses the effect exerted by
current inventories. The influence of stocks to price ratios is weakest in the copper market and is
significant only for the ratio of primary to old scrap prices. Considerable inventory influence on
the price ratios comes from past lags. Thus, the ratio of primary to secondary data does adjust to
the changing market conditions with time lags.
In the cases of zinc price ratios and aluminum primary to old and new scrap price ratios,
inventories hold a positive long run relationship to price ratios. Short run changes in price ratios
also hold a positive relationship to inventories for aluminum. In the case of zinc, price ratios are
influenced positively by the lagged inventory levels but are negatively affected by short run
inventory changes although the short run influence is not statistically significant. Last, short run
dynamics in these markets can be persistent since the adjustment rates to the long run
relationship that exists between the price ratios and inventories are not high10.
The ratio of primary to scrap metal prices is not constant since market conditions
influence primary and secondary metal prices to differing degrees. Price ratios increase as
inventories increase and decrease when inventories decline. This positive relationship of the
primary/scrap price ratio to metal market inventories suggests that scrap prices react more
violently to market condition changes than primary prices do. In times of ample supply, both
primary and scrap prices decrease, but the fall in scrap prices is greater. In periods of excess
demand and tight supply both primary and scrap prices increase, with scrap price increases being
relatively higher.

10

The speed of adjustment can range from zero to one.
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Secondary smelters and refineries depend fully on scrap for metal production and are
greatly affected by this phenomenon. These producers may find themselves at a disadvantage in
relation to primary smelters and refineries because their input costs are more volatile than their
sales and they have to engage in a great deal of market speculation. This may be the reason for
many suggestions in the copper industry to link scrap prices to LME copper prices (Blomberg
and Hellmer, 2000; Labys et al., 1971).
Finally, to the extent that price reactions to surface stocks could represent price
adjustments to reduced underground stocks, long term downward sloping trends of the primary
and scrap price ratio would indicate resource exhaustion. This is a possible direction for future
research which may be able to produce more conclusive results about resource exhaustion than
the study of primary resource prices alone. It is important to note that the positive long run
relationship found between price ratios and inventories for zinc and aluminium validates this
approach.

VI. Conclusions
This study describes interrelations between primary and scrap markets in terms of price
ratios. Understanding the relative behaviour of primary and scrap prices can be valuable to metal
market participants, especially in the decision making process of managers of secondary smelters
and refineries. In examining the dynamic relationship of primary and scrap metal prices through
time series methods, the results show that a long run equilibrium ties primary to scrap prices.
However, short run dynamics include movements away and adjustments towards equilibrium.
This unstable short run relationship between primary and scrap prices is verified by the timevarying ratios of primary to scrap prices. The fact that primary and scrap prices hold a long run
relationship in most markets suggests that policies that aim to increase recycling rates by
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decreasing the primary to scrap price ratio will not be able to sustain long term results. Such
policies could have a more significant effect in the old and new aluminium scrap markets where
a long run relationship between primary and scrap prices is not present. In addition, knowledge
that a long run equilibrium relationship exists between primary and scrap prices should make
scrap market participants cautious about their reaction to short run fluctuations of scrap prices.
In the latter part of the paper, it is shown that price ratios are related to market
fundamentals. The level of inventories in the market influences price ratios positively. In the case
of zinc, as well as the cases of new and old aluminum, this relationship is more pronounced in
the long run than the short run. Moreover, considerable inventory influence on price ratios comes
from past lags, since the ratio of primary to secondary prices adjusts to the changing market
conditions. The dynamic adjustment of price ratios to market information is also established by
the significant autoregressive coefficients of price ratios. These results can help metal market
participants anticipate or forecast relative changes in primary and scrap prices.
The theoretical explanation of the positive relationship between primary and scrap price
ratios to inventories found in this paper is provided by the production smoothing incentives of
metal producers. These lead to tighter connections between primary and scrap prices when
inventories are lower than when inventories are higher. In a tight market, the spread between
primary and scrap prices becomes smaller, whereas ample supply, as indicated by high
accumulation of inventories, means wider spreads between primary and scrap prices. Although
the empirical results attest to this structure for aluminium, zinc, and lead, the evidence is weaker
in the case of copper. Understanding the reasons why this relationship is not as pronounced in
the case of copper could provide additional insights into the structural relations between primary
and scrap prices. It should also be noted that production smoothing incentives are a short run

- 106 -

phenomenon and the long run equilibrium between inventories and price ratios, found in the case
of zinc and new and old aluminium scrap, could suggest there may be other forces that lead to
this relationship as well.
Finally, the positive relationship between the price ratios and the level of metal
inventories found in this study indicates that as inventories increase (decrease), both primary and
secondary prices increase (decrease), but scrap price reactions to market conditions are more
pronounced. The flexibility of scrap as an input to primary metal production is the reason the
ratio of primary to secondary prices is expected to hold a positive relationship to inventory
levels. It is important to note that the estimated Vector Error Correction models of primary and
scrap prices show that the partial adjustment towards the long run relationship between primary
and scrap prices is achieved through scrap price movements. This indicates both the higher
flexibility of scrap prices and the stabilizing force of the scrap sector for the metal markets.

- 107 -

References
Blomberg, J. and S. Hellmer. 2000. Short-run Demand and Supply Elasticities in the West
European Market for Secondary Aluminium. Resources Policy 26:39-50.
Eichenbaum, M. 1984. Rational Expectations and the Smoothing Properties of Inventories of
Finished Goods. Journal of Monetary Economics 14:71-96.
________. 1989. Some Empirical Evidence on the Production Level and Production Smoothing
Models of Inventory Investment. The American Economic Review 79 (4):853-864.
Engle, Robert F. and C.W.J. Granger. 1987. “Co-integration and Error Correction:
Representation, Estimation, and Testing,” Econometrica 55:251-276.
Eviews (version 5.1). 2005. Irvine, CA: Quantitative Micro Software.
Fisher, L.A. and A.D. Owen. 1981. An Econometric Model of the US Aluminum Market.
Resources Policy 7(3):150-160.
Fowler, R.F. 1937. The Substitution of Scrap for Pig-Iron in the Manufacture of Steel. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 52(1):129-154.
Granger, C.W.J. 2004. Time Series Analysis, Cointegration, and Application. Nobel Lecture,
December 8, 2003. The Nobel Prizes 2003:360-366.
Hamilton, James D. 1994. Time Series Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hashimoto, H. 1983. Modeling Price Fluctuations of Ferrous Scrap. Resources Policy
(June):122-139.
Holt, C. C., F. Modigliani F, J.F. Muth, and H.A. Simon. 1960. Planning Production,
Inventories, and Work Force. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.
International Aluminum Institute. 2003. Statistics. <http://www.world-aluminium.org/> (March
24, 2004).

- 108 -

Johansen, S. 1995. Likelihood-based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Models.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
________. 1991. Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian
Vector Autoregressive Models. Econometrica 59:1551–1580.
Labys, W.C. and M. Kaboudan. 1980. A Short Run Disequilibrium Model of the Copper Market.
Department Working Paper No. 16. Morgantown , WV: Department of Mineral and
Energy Economics, West Virginia University. Photocopied.
Labys, W.C., H.B. Rees, and C.M. Elliott. 1971. Copper Price behavior and the London Metal
Exchange. Applied Economics 3:99-113.
MacKinnon, J.G. 1996. Numerical Distribution Functions for Unit Root and Cointegration Tests.
Journal of Applied Econometrics 11:601-618.
MacKinnon, J.G., A.A. Haug, and L. Michelis. 1999. Numerical Distribution Functions of
Likelihood Ratio Tests for Cointegration. Journal of Applied Econometrics 14:563-577.
American Metal Market. 1984-2003. Metal Statistics. New York: American Metal Market.
Phillips, P.C.B. and P. Perron. 1988. Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression.
Biometrika 75:335–346.
Sims, C.A., James H.S., and M.W. Watson. 1990. Inference in Linear Time Series Models with
Some Unit Roots. Econometrica 58 (1):161–82.
Stollery, K.R. 1983. Secondary Supply of Copper and Ferrous Metals and Canadian Metal
Markets. Center for Resource Policies, Technical Paper n3. Kingston, Ontario: Queens
University.
Taylor, C. A. 1979. A Quarterly Domestic Copper Industry Model. The Review of Economics
and Statistics 61(3):410-422.

- 109 -

Commodity Research Bureau. 1984-2003. The CRB Commodity Yearbook. Chicago: Commodity
Research Bureau.
USGS. 2000. Recycling-Metals; Minerals Yearbook. Washington DC: US Geological Survey,
US Department of Interior.
USGS. 1955-. Copper; Minerals Yearbook. Washington DC: US Geological Survey, US
Department of Interior.
Van Beukering, P. and M.N. Bouman. 2001. Empirical Evidence on Recycling and Trade of
Paper and Lead in Developed and Developing Countries. World Development
29(10):1717-1737.

- 110 -

Appendix A
Table A1. Primary and Scrap Prices and Volatility by Metal (1985-1999)
Series

Prices
Means
1985-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96 1997-99

Aluminum
PPA
PS1A
PS2A
PS3A
Copper
PPC
PS1C
PS2C
Lead
PPL
PSL
Zinc
PPZ
PSZ

Standard Deviations
1985-87 1988-90 1991-93 1994-96 1997-99

58.99
31.47
24.98
40.52

90.67
65.21
55.80
60.57

56.77
43.05
37.87
39.08

76.14
56.16
51.25
57.00

69.45
51.87
46.82
52.17

11.67
6.79
4.68
8.24

17.76
10.53
9.39
10.00

4.86
4.10
3.88
4.07

10.62
8.15
7.33
9.14

6.72
5.95
5.92
5.91

71.81
63.08
53.00

124.88
109.85
94.41

102.77
94.17
82.09

119.47
108.56
91.36

87.16
81.19
66.50

13.87
12.10
11.18

15.74
11.03
9.70

10.09
11.04
11.25

18.38
14.63
13.19

16.30
15.30
13.09

25.92
9.62

40.65
15.67

33.74
15.32

43.86
19.51

46.98
20.11

8.49
4.33

5.14
2.22

2.13
1.82

5.86
4.07

1.64
2.62

40.10
19.84

72.27
40.33

52.44
37.45

51.21
32.01

-

4.63
4.87

12.57
10.46

6.61
5.07

3.60
2.09

-

Table A2. Price Ratios by Metal for Selected Time Periods
Series
Aluminum
PPA/PS1A
PPA/PS2A
PPA/PS3A
Copper
PPC/PS1C
PPC/PS2C
Lead
PPL/PSL
Zinc
PPZ/PSZ

1985-87

1988-90

Price Ratios
1991-93

1994-96

1997-99

1.883
2.363
1.459

1.387
1.623
1.495

1.321
1.504
1.456

1.358
1.488
1.341

1.343
1.493
1.335

1.139
1.360

1.137
1.323

1.094
1.260

1.098
1.307

1.074
1.314

2.820

2.621

2.224

2.296

2.365

2.112

1.861

1.412

1.602

-
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Appendix B
Table B1. VECM Models for Price Ratios and Inventories
Δ(PPA/PS1A) t = - 0.065[PPA/PS1At-1 - 0.580lnUSASt-1 + 2.622] - 0.0007 + εt
(-2.682)∗
(-2.235°
(-0.159)
2
Adj.R =0.032, AIC=-2.67

(C.1)

Δ(lnUSAS)t

= - 0.022[PPA/PS1At-1 - 0.533lnUSASt-1 + 2.622] - 0.004 + εt
(-3.029)∗
(-2.235)°
(-3.232)∗
2
Adj.R =0.041, AIC=-5.07

(C.2)

Δ(PPA/PS2A )t = - 0.046[PPA/PS2At-1 - 0.809lnUSASt-1 + 4.295] - 0.0003 + εt
(2.216)°
(-1.730)^
(-0.059)
2
Adj.R =0.020, AIC=-2.03

(C.3)

Δ(lnUSAS)t = - 0.012[PPA/PS2At-1 - 0.809lnUSASt-1 + 4.295] - 0.004+ εt
(-2.714)∗
(-1.730)^
(-3.217)∗
2
Adj.R =0.033, AIC=-2.06

(C.4)

Δ(PPZ/PSZ) t = - 0.135[PPZ/PSZt-1 - 0.554lnUSZSt-1 + 3.255]
(-3.503)∗
(-5.250)∗
(3.352)∗
+ 0.227Δ(PPZ/PSZ)t-1+ 0.020Δ(PPZ/PSZ)t-2 + 0.036Δ(PPZ/PSZ)t-3
(2.829)∗
(0.242)
(0.428)
- 0.048Δ(lnUSZS)t-1 - 0.121Δ(lnUSZS)t-2 - 0.126Δ(lnUSZS)t-3+ ε t
(-0.624)
(-1.558)
(-1.640)
Adj.R2=0.105, AIC=-0.76
Δ(lnUSZS)t = 0.126 [PPZ/PSZt-1 - 0.554lnUSZSt-1 + 3.255]
(3.326)∗
(-5.250)∗
(3.352)∗
- 0.254 Δ(PPZ/PSZ)t-1 - 0.051 Δ(PPZ/PSZ)t-2 + 0.047 Δ(PPZ/PSZ)t-3
(-3.217)∗
(-0.616)
(0.565)
+ 0.031 Δ(lnUSZS)t-1 + 0.148 Δ(lnUSZS)t-2 - 0.203 Δ(lnUSZS)t-3 + εt
(0.406)
(1.934)^
(-2.698)∗
2
Adj.R =0.150, AIC=-0.79

(C.5)

(C.6)

t-statistics in parentheses: ^ indicates significance at 0.10 level, ° indicates significance at 0.05 level, ∗ indicates
significance at 0.01 level.
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Table B2. Tests for Cointegration between Price Ratios and Inventories
Prices

Ho: r=p

Maximum Eigenvalue Test
Statistic
5% Crit.Val.
Prob.**

Statistic

Trace Test
5% Crit.Val.

Prob.**

Aluminum
PPA/PS1A,
USAS

p=0
p≤1

19.108*
0.735

14.265
3.841

0.008
0.391

19.843*
0.735

15.495
3.841

0.010
0.391

PPA/PS2A,
USAS

p=0
p≤1

15.234*
0.692

14.265
3.841

0.035
0.406

15.925*
0.692

15.495
3.841

0.043
0.406

22.500*
3.975

15.892
9.165

0.004
0.416

26.475*
3.975

20.262
9.165

0.006
0.416

Zinc
PPZ/PSZ,
USZS

p=0
p≤1

*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
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